Political Transitions in India

   John Samuel

The election to the 16^th Loksabha in India signifies a deeper political shift in terms of the character and mode of democratic politics in India.  While it is too early to give an account of the political consequences of such a shift, it is possible to analyse the factors that tend to influence such a shift in the Indian politics. Firstly, the old ‘congress system’- the predominant political software that defined the Indian democratic political process is more or less extinct. (The old ‘congress  system’-). It was a ‘power management’ adjustment that dominated the Indian political process ever since Independence; a combination of patron -client party-governance system that followed the principle and practice of multiple accommodation and flexible compromises to manage the plurality of interests and identities in India. Secondly, the conventional political party dynamics is undergoing a major shift. Political parties in India are facing a structural as well as political crisis. The autonomy of political parties are increasingly compromised by the influence of corporate ‘contributions’ and new breed of political mangers. Thirdly, the role of corporate capital in determining political and policy priorities will be significantly increased in the years to come. Fourthly, the role of new social media and new mode of technology will influence politics, policy and governance in a substantial manner.

 The mainstream politics within a given society get shaped by the dynamics of   public perceptions through constructing images, myths, symbolism and metaphors of change. In a networked society, these combinations of myth-making, image makeover and political symbolism often play a major role in building social and political legitimacy of a regime. Hence, the political transitions in India have multiple narratives and sub-texts that tend to shape the meta-narrative of the Indian politics. The outcome of the recent elections in India is in consonance with the shifts that happened in many parts of the world, particularly in different countries of Europe that witnessed the rise of political conservatism and a new form of virulent right wing political and policy agenda. In the last couple of years, in UK, Sweden, Denmark and Norway, the rise of right wing political conservatism captured the control of the government. This was partly in response to economic crisis and partly due to new politics of further marginalising the migrant and minority communities.   In that sense, the election in India once again signalled how economic crisis can create larger socio-political discontent, resulting in strong anti-incumbency syndrome across the board. There is a general perception that the electoral victory of the BJP marks the end of the Nehruvian consensus on Indian democracy. I would argue that the Nehruvian Consensus on Indian democracy began to disappear during the emergency and the post-emergency political transitions in India.  All through the last thirty years, the efforts by the various governments were to subvert or undermine or annul the Nehruvian legacy on democracy, governance and development in the national and international arena.

The competing visions of multiple political narratives

The struggle for the Independence is also the story of the competing visions of multiple narratives within the Indian National Congress and in the larger socio-political space of India.  The Indian National Congress itself was more of an umbrella formation with a wide spectrum of competing political narratives trying to contest, collaborate and reconcile with one another.  The origin of such multiple narratives can be traced back to the Renaissance in Bengal and the different perceptions of India by the newly educated neo-Brahmin elites in the early 19^th century onwards in different provinces of the colonial India.  These multiple narratives were, on the one hand, informed by the new ideals of modern nation-state and on the other hand informed by the predominant ‘national’ upper-caste identity. One can see two broad streams of such narratives: One is that of a narrative of ‘accommodative’ inclusive nationalism of the congress variety and other the assertive identity driven exclusive nationalism of the Muslim League and Hindu Mahasabha variety.

In the history of the Indian National Congress, there have been three parallel narratives competing as well as complementing each other. The first stream was that of political conformism; liberal advocacy of the socio-economic elites trying to expand the space within the system without confronting the system.  The first phase of the Indian National Congress from 1885 to 1905 dominated this conformist approach within the system, largely led by the new elites such Dadabhai Navaroji. The second stream of the Indian National Congress was a narrative of liberal Hindu nationalism that combined a patronising as well as ‘accommodating’ approach to the dalits, other backward castes and Muslims. This approach, informed by the neo-Brahmin elites and shaped by the more radical nationalist approach, was propounded by Bal Gangadhar Tilak and Madan Mohan Malavya.  Gandhi sought to transform the upper-caste Hindu nationalist discourse to a more moderate and ‘accommodative’ discourse with a combination of patronising as well as inclusive approach.  So on the one hand Gandhi transformed the dominant  Hindu nationalist Congress discourse propounded by the likes of Bal Ganghadhar Tilak  in the early twentieth century to a more inclusive as well as accommodative narrative that combined  new forms of mass-based politics with a strong undertone of the moderate Hindu discourse.  At the same time  framing such a popular folk-Hindu discourse with a pan-Indian nationalism sought to co-opt  the broad spectrum of multiple identities within the Indian context. This Gandhian experiment of  combining the main text of  moderate-populist Hindu nationalism along with the subtext of modern inclusive pan-Indian Nationalism across caste and creed   influenced in many ways the very DNA of the Indian National Congress from the 1920s to 1950s. The third narrative within the Indian National Congress was that of a rights-based cosmopolitan democratic vision, influenced to a large extent by the  socialists as well as social democratic experiments in Europe. This cosmopolitan and inclusive rights based approach was propounded by the socialist faction within the congress as well as the stream of congress leaders led by Jawaharlal Nehru. The politics of inclusive ‘accommodation’ and ‘compromising reconciliation’, built on a populist-moderate Hindu discourse of Gandhi, also sought to  negotiate with the modern – cosmopolitan social democratic internationalist vision of the stream represented by Jawaharlal Nehru.  While the ideological and political DNA  of the Indian National Congress  has been influenced by the three  major streams( represented by Dadabai Navaroji, Bala Gangadhar Tilak, Gandhi and Nehru), the organisational narrative and hardware were informed by a neo-elite upper castefeudal tendency(or culture?) However, dominant  political narrative of inclusive accommodation was also reflected in the character and nature of the Indian Constituent Assembly as well as  in the making of the first cabinet.  In many ways, Sardar Patel and Dr. Rajendra Prasad signified the broad accommodative moderate Hindu nationalist discourse of the Gandhian variety; C Rajgopalachari signified the liberal advocacy stream and Nehru signified the modern cosmopolitan democratic discourse. While these conservative as well as ‘accommodative’ moderate Hindu nationalist discourse in symbiosis with a cosmopolitan modern democratic rights-based discourse informed the ‘nation-building’ exercise of the independent India, feudal culture still remained in the  sub-texts that influenced the Indian political experiments at all levels.  The politics of patronisation and accommodative inclusion, informed by a feudal culture of co-option of marginalised,  with a constant negotiation between identities and interest formed the core of the ‘Congress System’ of managing governance over a period of the last seventy years. However, the four major protagonists of the counter discourses, Dr. Ambedkar, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Hedgewar and to some extent Subash Chandra Bose, sought to challenge the inclusive accommodative discourse of patronisation on entirely different grounds.

Paradigm Shifts in Indian Politics

 The first paradigm shift in the Indian Political process was in the late 1960s. The major challenge to the Gandhi-Nehru legacy that combined a politics of ‘accommodative’ inclusion and cosmopolitan democratic politics became more obvious from 1967 onwards.  The Congress hegemony was challenged by the left-wing as well as the right-wing political narratives in the late 1960s.  The assertive emergence of the socialist and left forces of India sought to challenge the mainstream feudal accommodative politics with a politics of egalitarianism and emancipation. Even within the left wing narratives, a major (or the main) stream sought to challenge the system through contestation and collaboration within the larger constitutional framework, while the other stream ( Maoists/Naxalites) sought to challenge the very legitimacy  of the  entire system through violent confrontation. At the same time, RSS began to use a three- prong strategy to influence the policy, politics and governance of India. First, through a volunteer based cadre building of children and youth and strategic infiltration of them into governance system, RSS managed to remain  low profile and do a long term influence within the governance system of India. This in effect created a generation of saffronised mock-liberals in the India media, civil service and armed forces. Secondly , RSS influenced the Indian National Congress by encouraging many of its followers to subvert the congress system from within. So if one scrutinises the political and ideological genealogy of many congress leaders who emerged after the 1960s, one can find the RSS links in their formative stages. These swayam sevaks practised a subversive politics within congress by undermining the modern cosmopolitan social-democratic vision of the Nehru, and by promoting the less inclusive and more accommodative politics of the soft-hindutva variety.  The third strategy of RSS was to promote its own political party, first as Jansangh and then its modern and more accommodative version in the form of Bharatiya Janatha Party.

The second paradigm shift in the Indian political process was in the post-emergency period from 1977 to 1982.  In fact the period of 1977-1982 also witnessed paradigm shift in the international political discourse and process. It was in 1977 that the regime change in Iran resulted in  major political shifts not only in Iran but also in the USA. The advent of Ronald Reagan and Margret Thatcher signalled a new era of assertive right-wing politics that combined aggressive political conservatism and active neo-liberal policy paradigm.  It is(orwas) during the same phase that Pakistan witnessed a regime change and the hanging of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the democratically elected Prime Minister of Pakistan. The regime change in Pakistan was the beginning of the new phase of cold war and the engagement with  identity –based aggressive politics as an anti-dote to challenge the socialist hegemony of the USSR.  During this phase, the hike in petrol price and the regime change in Egypt along with those in many other countries resulted in the increase of foreign debt of several countries culminating in the dominance of neo-liberal policy paradigm. In the Indian context, this is the period that witnessed the withering away of the one party-congress hegemony in the governance system. This resulted in the new assertion of identity-based political party formations by Dalits( BSP) as well as by the other backward castes( in UP and Bihar) and also brought in  the proponents of Hindutva in to the mainstream of the political and governance process of India. Most of the dominant regional party formations like BSP and (BJP?) emerged during the same phase.

The Technocratic and Federalist Turn of   the Indian Politics

While an increasing disjuncture of ‘national’ vs ‘regional political discourse’ emerged in the post-emergency political paradigm, a new political narrative began to dominate the policy making apparatus and governance of India.  This was the emergence of a new species of urban-educated upper-caste technocrats, devoid of any grassroots political experience or ideological convictions, taking the central role in the policy, governance and eventually political discourse of India. The politics  at the state level  began to be dominated by the more rural and backward political class who spoke Hindi or regional languages. There was  the urban technocratic elites( those who primarily occupy power positions largely due to their skill-set and less due to a strong political credibility  or convictions) in the media, political parties and corporate sector. This highly educated, articulate and upper caste- urban English speaking class born  began to chart a new political narrative and discourse in the Indian political process. The Delhi-centric educated and articulate urban elite class began to dominate the policy and political discourse of all political parties, including that of the Congress, BJP and CPM. While in the 1970s, many of these Delhi-centric elites operated in the backroom or background of the governance and political process, by the 1980s this new urban articulate elite class began to occupy the centre stage of all national political parties ; their comfort level with the new media elites and new corporate elites resulted in a new technocratic  nexus between political parties, corporate media and corporate business conglomerates.  In so many ways,this contributed to the eventual ascent of  the non-political Manmohan Singh, a  Delhi-centric civil servant respected for his skill-sets, to the role of the Prime Minister of India.

The congress won the 1985 elections with overwhelming majority and it was paradoxically due to an electoral wave of moderate Hindu nationalism as a reaction to the assassination of Indira Gandhi by her Sikh security guards in October 1984. The violence against Sikh Community in Delhi,  in the aftermath of the assassination  of Indira Gandhi, indicated the steady retreat of the Nehruvian consensus/legacy within the congress.  As the Nehruvian legacy of Congress politics began to recede to the background, a new politics with two new characteristics began to come to the forefront of governance and political process: a) the reinvention of Saradar Patel’s variety of moderate Hindu accommodative political discourse(  signified by the Narasimha Rao regime) and b)  a new form of telegenic – Delhi-centric urban and upper caste technocratic political nexus that dominated political parties, media world and corporate conglomerates.

The Retreat of the Nehruvian Legacy

During the regime of the Narasimha Rao- Manmohan Sigh in the 1990s, the Nehrivan legacy was displaced from the arena of governance as well as the political process within the congress; eventually congress too adopted a politics of accommodative compromises with multiple corporate interests and identity formations. So in the 1980s- and 1990s, the disjuncture between the Delhi-centric English speaking technocratic political governance process and the rural-based regional/state level politics began to pull Indian political discourse in to two different directions.  The political narrative of the politics at the state level began to get separated from the ‘national politics’. This ‘federalist’ turn of the Indian political process began to create new political narrative based on language- and cast/community identity.  So the contestation and collaboration between the rural based identity –driven regional politics and interest driven national politics began to dominate the Indian political process in the 1990s. This contestation and collaboration is signified by two Prime Ministers in the 1990s: Devagowda – the first ‘outsider’ ( outside to  the Delhi-centric national paradigm) politician to become the Prime Minister of India and IK Gujaral- who was a  representative of the Delhi-centric political elites that dominated the national politics.  And the eventual ascent of Manmohan Singh actually signalled the ultimate demise of the Nehruvian legacy within the governance or within the Indian National Congress.  The demise of the Nehruvian legacy was not only in terms of policy paradigm, but also in terms of the character and nature of the electoral politics.

The ascent of the Delhi-centric technocratic political elites also resulted in the new modes of fund raising through strengthening the role of corporate financing of election. It is reported that most of the elections in India are actually financed through black money (or funds), contributed by corporate interests. So instead of raising funds from the members or supporters of the party at the grassroots level,  it was much easier to raise money from corporate conglomerates who sought to have a direct role in governance. It was also easy for the neo-technocratic elites to engage with the new media elites and corporate elites as they have been a part of the same ‘economic growth at any cost’ narrative.  The corporate investments in the political party process and election resulted in outsourcing campaign and political strategy to advertising agencies. And instead of a bottom-up political process, a top down political management process began to dominate almost all political parties. The leadership of  most of the political parties  managed politics with funding support from the power-centres of the party. The campaign materials, communications and election strategy were  managed  at the top ,with the active participation of the neo-political elites with hardly any experience at the grassroots level political process.  And this new culture of Delhi-centric political elitism dominated policy choices and governance process. Policy options and choices were begun to be influenced by network of corporate interests and this also resulted in  consequent corruption across the spectrum of governance. The Neera Radia tapes clearly exposed how such a Delhi-centric power-nexus operated across party –lines, media houses and governance structures. Such elite take over of the mainstream political process and policy options eroded the broader legitimacy of  the political parties and process.

The Story of a Political Disaster Foretold

While the UPA- I sought to do a balancing act between the interest of the rural poor and the urban corporate rich with a serious of legislations, the UPA -II was perceived as the government for the rich and corporate conglomerates . A  series of corruption charges further eroded the credibility and legitimacy of the government  and its technocratic leadership. The Right to Information, Right to Work and many other initiatives like NRHM during the UPA I  sought to introduce more of inclusive economic growth. The relatively better social protection legislation and the relatively better economic growth during the UPA-1  gave rich electoral dividends for the congress and  its allies in the elections held in 2009. However, the fact of the matter was such an electoral gain seems to have created a false impression within the congress that it was a national mandate for the new Delhi-centric technocratic policy paradigm.  This wrong analysis and the over-confidence bordering political arrogance resulted in the marginalisation of voices from the states or from the grassroots political leaders. The price hike of fuels and essential commodities sent wrong signals to women across all classes and regions. The perceived arrogance of the Delhi-centric political elites to the Anti-Corruption campaign and the imprisonment of Anna Hazare( who signified the rural idealism and Gandhian legacy along with a tinge of soft-Hindutva) sent  wrong signals to the rural electorate as well as the middle class ‘sick’ of corruption scandals. Arvind Kejriwal, who also in many ways a representative of the urban –centric technocratic elite, sought to create a counter discourse to the corrupt nexus among the political, economic and media elites   The Anna-Kejariwal combine was also an effort to project a rural-urban political alliance to counter the Delhi-centric political nexus among political parties, corporate houses and media.   And the rather slow response of the leadership of the congress party  to the mass mobilisation in relation to the gang-rape case in Delhi (and elsewhere)  also alienated a large number of men and women across the country. Eventually, the two kinds of LPGs ensured the fall of UPA-II. The first one  was the unbridled effort to Liberalise, Privatise and Globalise resulting in unprecedented economic and social inequities  and consequence  economic insecurity among large sections of people across the country- and second one  was the  price hike of the Liquefied Petroleum Gas.  And the much publicised technocratic solution of Aadhaar Card and insistence of Aadhaar card for cash-transfer instead of subsidised LPG cylinders added  fuel to the fire of sky-rocketing price of food and vegetables. The economic recession also resulted in the closing down of many small and medium level enterprises and many people getting less income and consequent diminution of household budget.  All those policy options and choices cumulatively eroded the political and moral legitimacy of the UPA- II and  that of the congress party at the grassroots level.  In their enthusiasm to have as many policy reforms as fast as they could, the leadership of the government was too busy to note the brewing discontent and frustrations within the congress party at the grassroots level and also across the larger polity in India.  So the lack of political imagination in policy making and the over-predominance of Delhi-centric technocratic elites in the governance did not inspire the grassroots workers of the congress and consequently congress party became more and more sedated and stagnant at the grassroots level.  The grassroots workers of the congress party across the states found it difficult to defend food price inflation, and the price hike of petrol/diesel and LPG.

The increasing gap between the grassroots workers and leaders of congress party and the Delhi-centric policy makers in effect paralysed the party network and structures on the ground. There was less collective ownership for the policy paradigm propounded by the technocratic elites. One  of the richest men in India was put in charge of one of the most expensive technocratic projects of UID, sending wrong signals that the UPA- II favoured the rich and powerful in the policy making as well as political choices. As the top-down policy and political process began to dominate, the entire communication and campaign strategy and their implementation was (or were) outsourced to advertising companies without any sense of agency or collective ownership at the state or grassroots level. In effect, not only communications but also politics itself was outsourced to ‘experts’ devoid of any experience of political dynamics at the grassroots level. This disjuncture between the grassroots network of the congress party and the top-down technocratic approach to electoral campaign coupled with more centralised management of election finance/funding meant that grassroots workers were not inspired to campaign for the congress party in many states; consequently the traditional voters drifted away from the party.  The feeder mechanism of congress party as well as that of many other political parties got stagnant since there was no incentive for young people to join party politics. As most of the young people secured parliament seats largely as a matter of inheritance, many of the young leaders with competence and commitment did not have much of political incentives to join the congress party. Many of them either chose to work within the civil society or in the corporate leadership.  Increasing number of technocratic managers and telegenic personalities active in the TV studios and  with zero presence at the grassroots level also send wrong signals to leaders at the state level who rose in the party hierarchy by building the congress party at the grassroots level.

So the enabling condition for the rise of Modi and BJP was created over a period of time due to the increasing gap between the congress party at the grassroots level and the technocratic policy makers in Delhi; and the tendency to dictate governance as well as party decisions from the top to bottom rather than the other way around.

The Rise of the Modi-Myth

In so many ways, Narendra Modi is a beneficiary and product of the politics of accommodation and compromises played by the congress party over the last twenty years. The Narendra Modi brand is also indicative of the co-option of a dominant narrative  and at the same time making a counter–discourse to another set of narrative within the congress system. The rise of Narendra Mody Myth is not something that began in one year or two. It actually began around ten years ago, by creating entrenched  image of technocratic efficiency coupled with political imagination to influence public perceptions. The Narendra Modi metaphor was a counter-discourse to the dominant political narrative because of four reasons: a) He signified the ascend of an ‘outsider’ and positioned as an alternative to the Delhi-centric technocratic elites b) The story of his rise from a relatively lower caste and lower class rural background speaking in ‘people’s language’ (always spoke in Hindi or Gujarathi) inspired a large number of rural youth and rural poor c)  The Modi brand also signified the rise of a ‘federal’ leader who proved his capability in the area of governance and in the area of electoral accomplishments  in  his state  d) Modi brand building also was a sign of vibrant Gujarat campaign as a counter-alternative to the perception of a   ‘corruption-ridden’ regime in Delhi. So the Modi- brand has been established over the last five years, through consistent messaging and communication strategy.  On the one hand these ‘counter-discursive’ images helped him to project himself as a man of the rural masses, as a sign of the rural-based entrepreneurship and as someone who can ‘deliver efficiently and effectively’.  Along with these counter discourse, the Modi campaign managers intelligently subverted the dominant narrative within the history of the congress party.  The campaign managers intelligently co-opted the metaphor of Sardar Vallabhai Patel that indicated on the one hand the narrative of the moderate and accommodative Hindu Nationalism and on other hand the image of a leader who stood with the rural peasants and who delivered on the unity and integrity of India.  The image of Sardar Patel as the ‘steel man’- indicating strength, determination and resilience- created a sort of reflected glory in the Modi-brand. So the co-option of Sardar Patel as part of the Mody myth was a clever ploy to revitalize a dominant narrative within the history of the congress party and at the same time denying the congress to claim such a legacy. 

The very DNA of BJP is of assertive Hindu Nationalism, based on politics of exclusion  propounded by the core ideology of RSS.  However, the campaign managers of Modi narrative pushed the long term political agenda of assertive ‘Hindutva’ in the background and projected the ‘development’ ‘governance’ and ‘economic growth’ agenda into the foreground, along with the moderate accommodative soft Hindu nationalist legacy of  Bal Gangathar Thilak, Madan Mohan Malavya and Sardar Vallabhai Patel.  This twin strategy of co-opting the one of these strong narratives within the congress and at the same time projecting as a counter-discursive alternative to the Delhi-centric technocratic elites, helped to create a Pan-Indian appeal to the Modi metaphor. And the strategy to frame messages locally, as a representative of  the down trodden and marginalised castes, helped Narendra Modi brand to find acceptance with the rural masses and particularly among the lower caste groups. At the same time, his projected image as a man who can deliver economic growth and good governance as well as  the image of a leader who meant business influenced a large section of the middle class people in many states of India. The strategic use of social media and social network also  inspired the new generation of voters  to vote for Modi. In a way, this election was a quasi-presidential election and such an aggressive campaign with huge contributions from corporate conglomerates can undermine the very promises(or premise) of the parliamentary democracy and (the promises of) the constitution of India.

The Predicament of the Congress Party

In fact, both the Sardar Patel image as well as the ‘development’ – ‘good governance’ – economic growth’ slogans were co-opted from the dominant narratives of the congress party. While AAP has co-opted the ‘aam- admi ka hath’ slogan  and the Gandhi cap of the congress party, Narendra Modi and BJP co-opted the two dominant narratives of the congress party. Two kinds of challenges( signified by Narendra Modi and Arvind Kejriwal)- creating a counter discourse to UPA- II, robbed congress of its dominant political narratives , election slogans and policy narrative( of economic growth and good governance).  In spite of the traditional lip services to Gandhi and Nehru, over a period of the last twenty years the rise of technocratic political elites within the congress in effect marginalised and then buried the core Nehru legacy and ideology   within the governance and the dominant policy priorities of the congress party. Devoid of the active legacy of Gandhi, Nehru and Sardar Vallabhai Patel,  it was difficult for campaign managers of the congress party to reinvent or reboot the myths of the past icons  that helped to create credibility and communicative advantage at the grassroots level.   Void of a  coherent political perspective, it was not easy to create an innovative and inspiring set of political and policy agenda, free from the baggage of the legacy of the UPA- II.

The real challenge for the congress is when BJP seeks to occupy the accommodative moderate Hindu Nationalism along with ‘good governance ‘agenda on the foreground and the RSS agenda of exclusive politics in the background.   From various signals, the new Prime Minister will on the one hand create a new image of an assertive leader who is also willing to accommodate and include the minorities and marginalised in his broad political and policy narratives.; and on the other hand effectively re-brand the very same corporate- friendly policies of UPA- II.. This creates an ideological as well as policy challenge for the congress party. The new Mody-myth  is about a new branding of  ‘popular and assertive’ leader who is ready to make a new tryst with new India. And this Mody myth is now entrenched through a series of communication strategies and concerted media campaign.  If  Modi proved to be accommodative as well as assertive, that can certainly pose a challenge to  the future strategies of the congress and the National parties.

Hence, congress may have to reinvent its ideological legacy and also revitalize its grassroots structures and workers and  build credible leadership from the grassroots level. This also means that the technocratic policy/political elites should be in the background of the political process rather than on the foreground of the political narrative of the congress party. The question is whether there will be a collective political imagination to reinvent the grand old party of India.

This election also exposed the structural limitation and political crisis of the left political parties in a number of ways.  Like congress, the left political parties also suffered from the increasing gap in perception and perspective of the Delhi-centric policy/political elites and the grassroots political cadre.  Since Left parties lost the sheen in the wake of compulsions to compromise principles for the sake of quick-win in election,  their moral and political credibility eroded in a significant way at the grassroots level.  

The real challenge for the leadership of social democratic and left parties in India will be when leaders are in a state of denial and refuse to challenge and change themselves and feel reluctant to inspire change or attract a new generation of workers and leaders at all levels.

The real challenge of the Modi-myth is to live up to the huge expectations implicit in the election mandate and at the same time being committed to the letter and spirit of the Constitution of India. The second key issue will be the challenges of imposing a dominant Modi-narrative in the form of popular authoritarianism  within the government, within the BJP and within the larger polity.  The third key challenge for Indian democracy is the absence of a relatively dispersed and limited opposition within the parliament and the possibilities of the Hindutva forces dominating and subverting the civil society process within the country.

 Hence, it is the historical as well as political responsibility of the Indian National Congress, secular regional parties and the left parties to work together as a responsible and responsive opposition and also revitalise their own grassroots level politics to democratise party structures and organisation to make India a vibrant democracy at all levels. Congress may have to reinvent and re-launch the legacy of Gandhi and Nehru in the context of the 21^st century.  The multiple political transitions in India suggest several political imperatives, thereby underscoring the need for citizens to recommit themselves to the Constitution of India.