John Samuel
One of the positive outcomes of the recent mobilisation for the Lokpal-bill to challenge corruption at various levels of government is that it has revitalised the political debates in India, particularly among the 'apolitical' class. Though in terms of substantive demands, the Anna-team did not achieve anything new (as they simply changed the goal post, climbing down from their earlier demands); they succeeded in putting 'corruption' at the centre of political discourse. They also showed the possibilities for new politics.
The ongoing debates and discussions in the cyber space, in media, in the drawing rooms and in public spaces in a way signify the relevance of social mobilisations- in support of the campaign against corruption. It is the political debates about the nature and character of 'representative democracy', the new modes of mobilisation and the relevance( or irrelevance) of the 'old' left in new India etc that are more interesting than the advocacy campaign itself.
It is indicative of a political trend- beyond a mere 'storm in urban tea-cup'. Here are ten broad observations on some of the aspects of the changing trends.
1) There is less space for politically aware middle class to join a political party or mainstream political process- as the political parties are still in the old mode with less space for horizontal entry beyond the usual feeder mechanism. Even now in most of the political parties (except for the Left Parties) the lineage matters more than the political vision or commitment or grassroots experience. One in every six of MPs is there because of his/her family connections rather the political experience or commitment.
2) Software of Indian politics is changing though the hardware has not changed. The political and policy process in India has changed significantly in the last fifteen years. There is a new middle class with more access to knowledge, technology, social networking, income and global exposure. The modes of power, social legitimation and leadership have changed significantly in the last twenty years. However, the structural character of the Indian political party system is still based on a model that emerged in the early 1980s; in the post-emergency period in of the Indian politics.
3) The modes of communications determine the modes of mobilisation and modes of politics in many ways. Look at how the profile of the political leaders changed during the televised modes of political communications. Hardly anyone of them have worked directly with people or mobilised them at the grassroots. They walked to the political central stage through the TV studios. They have been telegenic- articulate – and their core communicative competence was more evident in the Television studios; they derived their political legitimacy in the television studios or they came ‘live’ in front of active TV cameras, though they may not be at ease with the dust and sweat of the road or the noises of the masses . Many of them have been lawyers or relatively better educated from the urban upper middle class and cast. The emergence of Kapil Sibal, Manu Abishek Singhvi, Chidambaram, Jayaram Ramesh, Arun Jetly, Sushma swaraj, Sitaram Yetchury or Brinda Karat- is indicative of the faces of the 'telegenic' phase of the Indian politics. In the telgenic phase of politics, journalism itself became an instant ‘performance’ of mono-act or drama on the TV studios or on the road, rather than the old modes of analytical journalism or nuanced critique.
The telegenic media politics and the ‘instant’ journalism of performing actors was all about playing for the ‘moment’ and performing for an ‘imagined’ community. Mass politics was submerged under the ‘media politics’ – like the fast food chains that provided ‘instant’ gratification. Market and media collided to create instant ‘sensex’ of politics. It is here that the new age advocacy actors from the non-party political-civil space began to ‘outsmart’ the old politicians by performing the media politics and network modes of mobilisation. They were the telegenic ‘civil society’ counter-parts to the ‘smart’ politicians who walked to the centre stage through the television performance. They belonged to the same class: articulate urban upper cast middle class. People were largely ‘means’ to them rather than the ‘end’ of democracy. Rhetoric often preceded the reality of a billion people. In a world where market, media and telegenic performance determined the political ‘clout’, the new ‘civil society’ too learned the art of playing to ‘instant’ politics as performance: competing for the TRP rating in the market place of the media mediation of manufactoring perceptions.
But now in the age of social media - and new possibilities of communications, the name of the game is changing again. Here, the ‘civil society’ actors are ahead of the old political class in terms of the ‘communication’ game of shaping perception of power. Power of influencing perception became more important than the real power of the people on the ground. Politics itself was reduced to ‘virtual’ game in the market place of perceptions.
4) When mainstream political parties get reduced to electoral network to merely win or lose elections, other actors take the political spaces beyond the periodic winning or losing elections. That is precisely the reasons for the relevance and space of new advocacy networks and organisations: from KSSP, to Narmada Bachao, to RTI movement, to Right to work( NREGA) campaign to the present anti-corruption campaigns. Look at all the key legislations (including the campaign for political participation of women) in the last fifteen years. None of them came from the mainstream political parties Most of the demand first emerged in the political-civil space beyond the political parties and then political parties 'responded' by absorbing them in to the policy agenda. And this happens when the sole preoccupation of political parties end up as 'winning or losing ' an election.
Ideology took a back seat - except in the empty slogans and rhetoric. Interest of the leaders (in capturing power of the state) often took a front seat. Politics of electoral convenience often replaced the politics of conviction. Political opportunism itself was elevated in to 'smart' politics- hiring 'media' experts, advertising professionals, 'campaign' managers- and slogans often coined by the copy-writers of the ad-firms in charge of 'designing' the best 'campaigns' to earn more seats( by hook or crook). This is a far cry from the politics of the ideals and ideas of the Nehruvian phase in the post independent India.
When ideology (or political vision or mission) gets replaced by a mix of identity (cast, creed, language ) and 'interest' based electoral arithmetic, the real politics of transformation simply fail to go beyond the 'pressure' politics and redundant rhetoric played for the moment. It is in such spaces that civil society activism find its relevance and influence in the mainstream political landscape of India.
5) Whether one likes it or not, middle class always shaped the broader political discourse in India or elsewhere- from communism to capitalism to fascism to Hindutva. So the role of middle class in the Indian politics is nothing new. Most of the ideologues and political leaders came from the ‘great’ Indian middle class- and largely from the upper cast.
Anna Hazare happened to be simply a signifier: here the old symbols of 'ideals' met with new modes of mobilisation- beyond the usual institutional network of political parties. There is also a message: those in government or power can no longer simply take people for granted. And in the age of social networking- mobilisation and public opinions can also be shaped beyond the mainstream media and mainstream politics. There is the possibility of a new politics beyond ‘winning’ elections every five years and enjoying the stay in the corridors of the state power.
6) The rural-urban divide has political implications in India. In the post-independent India, there has been four major political transitions- (towards the end of 60s the end of Nehruvian era-; the end 70s- the end of congress period- and one party rule in post-emergency phase ; the end 80s- the emergence of the telegenic politics in the age of globalisation, and assertive Hindutva competing for vote bank. All these periods were marked by various degrees of political expressions and modes of mobilisation. Almost all of them had an urban middle class link- even in the case of Naxals- in shaping the discourse.
7) However, it would be rather simplistic to compare the new social- network based mobilisation of the urban middle class to the Gandhian mode of political struggles for freedom against colonialism and imperialism. Politics against injustice, oppression and domination preceded the methods of Gandhi. Gandhian methods did not define his politics. His politics and ethics shaped his choice of methods and communication. Gandhi’s politics was the politics of the masses- and not the politics of the mass media. Gandhi worked and lived with people, listened to them, educated and empowered them- and spent a life time experimenting with his ideas and methods, without compromising the ideals for transformation. Gandhi sought to transform politics and not to transcend politics.
Here, in the case of the media –driven performance of the Anna team, method preceded the politics. It was more of the politics of instant performance, seeking to influence perceptions of a particular class, rather than a mass politics to challenge and change the situation. It sought to ‘transcend’ politics rather than transforming politics. It sought to create symbols devoid of substance. It is interesting to note that how Anna team sought to play around with symbols of ‘convenience’ playing to the need of the media market. The performance of protest began in the backdrop the ‘bharat-matha’ ( mother India), appealing to the upper cast ‘Hindu’ sentiments- and then shifted to the use of an elegantly designed photograph of Gandhi with ‘Charkha’ and waving the tri-coloure national flag to ‘nationalise’ and ‘secularise’ the performance of a fast. A colourful performance of protest, where Kiran Bidi played the Cheer leader on the ‘stage’ and Anna pretended to be Gandhi was a spectacle of a performance as an instant politics meant for the media. Masses became simply a means to ‘show off’ the power- rather than the real source of power. Hence, it was a mockery of Gandhian principles, practise and methods of politics. In Gandhian case, media followed his politics. In this case, the politics of performance followed the media.
9) Anna was more of symbol in a campaign- primarily promoted by the Delhi-centric upper cast and middle class-actors. The anomaly of Anna ( an ex-army man from rural India of ‘jai-jawan- jai kisan variety, with a bit of Gandhian touch and grassroots NGO background) in the urban-back drop and mass media provided the combination of a seeming ‘ideal’ with combination of instant networking. Anna symbolised the ‘old’ India, and the young India was performed by the ‘youth’ on the street- all televised instantly as the performance of a spectacle, with the corallarly drama created in the TV studios. Kiran Bedi performed for the media- the spectacle of the elite post-retirement ‘civil servant’ transiting in to ‘civil society’'activist' in search of the TV cameras. ‘Civil society’ itself became a residual space for the new elites to find their space within the media mediations. The Bollywood and the ‘Lagan’ fame Amir Khan added a celebrity flavour to the new ‘civil society’ celebrities manufactured by the media.
It was indeed a smart experiment in the new mode of advocacy campaign - making strategic use of symbols ( Anna too was one), media and networking. And it was not a 'political struggle'- or a Satyagraha of Gandhian politics. It was an example of smart urban-based advocacy campaign. Though there are many interesting lessons to learn from it - it can't be compared with a political struggle of salt sataygraha or even the anti-emergency campaign.
How can a bill made by a team of four or five people, making a rather tall claim of a 'people's (or Jan) Lokpal bill? They hardly consulted or discussed with people on the ground in a diverse country of more than a billion people. They sought to connect with people through media, rather than the other way around. And of course, there were also characters in the Anna team (from soft saffron to those who were looking for 'celebrity' spot on the TV) who got them excited by their voice and sight in the TV- and them performed-waving the national flag- for the TV crew, ever hungry for the next spectacle. Their protest was indeed significant and it is indicative of the transition, even though it is of instant transitory type of politics of protest.
10) While I think the mobilisation is indicative of a trend, I do not agree with the content and modes of Anna team- particularly its tall claim of ‘second freedom struggle’ or mass-based politics. Bringing thousands of people on the few streets of few cities of India, through media and networking- is not a substitute for the substantive politics in a country of more than 1.2 billion of people.
In a parliamentary democracy, the role of parliament is cardinal. Political parties are the main political force in the country that sustains the health of a representative system of democracy. I also think there are a large number of committed and aware politicians with a sense of integrity. Just because a section of politicians and political party system is corrupt - does not mean that the political class - as a whole - is corrupt.
While it may be important to challenge and influence those who hold power- of the state, it is also important to recognise the limitations of 'quick-fix' seven day wonders of televised mobilisation. Because such advocacy campaign can simply create illusions of politics when actually such 'televised' quick-fix mobilisation can undermine the real political or democratic struggles on the ground. And the campaign for the so-called 'Jan' lokpal bill was an example of a relatively successful advocacy campaign for a policy change, and not an example of a political struggle for freedom or against injustice. )
The ongoing phase of politics is indicative of a political transition. The politics in India in the next ten years may be dramatically different - in terms of modes of mobilisation, composition of leadership and the issues that would come up. So the mode of mobilisation of those who are born in the eighties is indicative of a bigger shift. The anti-corruption campaign just happened to be a space to voice a discontent with the mainstream political party process in India- where the lineage matters more than the real politics. If the political parties do not change their hardware and present modes of operation, many of them would not be able to mobilise people beyond the elction season,in the years to come
