John Samuel
The world is no longer the same. Words and images have become fleeting sights.
Multi-polar world and multi-polar perceptions create multiple fluxes in
politics. Perceptions are changing So is
politics. So is poetry. Multiple shifts are on the
way and may move in the uncharted pathways.
The way power is acquired, managed and exercised is changing. Multiple shifts create multiple imaginations, interpretations and responses. Shifts in modes of communication, modes of living and modes of organisations create new predicaments, reactions and backlashes. When such substantive shifts happen, those who are ‘used’ to the established way of managing power cling to their ‘tradition’ and the world view they imbibed in the last century. There is a new flux in sense and sensibilities. There is a generational shift happening, though the old generation of ideas and institutions still want to cling to the power-matrix that made meaning to their private and public sphere. And there is a flux in politics at the national and international levels.
The way power is acquired, managed and exercised is changing. Multiple shifts create multiple imaginations, interpretations and responses. Shifts in modes of communication, modes of living and modes of organisations create new predicaments, reactions and backlashes. When such substantive shifts happen, those who are ‘used’ to the established way of managing power cling to their ‘tradition’ and the world view they imbibed in the last century. There is a new flux in sense and sensibilities. There is a generational shift happening, though the old generation of ideas and institutions still want to cling to the power-matrix that made meaning to their private and public sphere. And there is a flux in politics at the national and international levels.
The ideas and institutions
that emerged in the aftermath of the post-second world war are in a flux.
The old ideas and mode of organising is saturated, though yet to disappear. The
new forms of politics and mobilisation are yet to find a clear shape. This
‘in-between’ phase of flux create a crisis of perception and politics. The’
Kiss of love’ or the ‘occupy the wall street’ or ‘protests’ in Cairo or Arab 'spring' are
signifiers of new flux in the world and harbingers of emerging political
possibilities.
Following are some of the emerging trends in the international politics, indicating the possibilities of a deeper shift in the international order that emerged in the aftermath of the second world world war.
a) Nemesis of the
‘Washington Consensus’
There is no longer any consensus in Washington. This is not merely because of the shifting
political equations wherein the republicans captured the Senate and the
Congress, but also because the American hegemony in the international
world order is on the decline. The American dream is struggling to survive in a
multi-polar world where the epicenters of knowledge, innovation and economy are
shifting away from Washington. The unilateral policy, political and military
might of the USA got over-extended over a period of the last twenty-five years and as a
result too saturated to make persistent influence through military and economic might alone. The
‘Washington’ consensus was symbolic of the hegemony of the policy and knowledge
framework operated through the dominant knowledge and policy institutional networks.
However, with increasing shifts in the political economy of international
relations, trade, aid and debt, ‘Washington’ consensus is more of a history.
The International political matrix organised around two
major power blocks, that emerged in the aftermath of the second war began with
the fall of the Berlin Wall and the political dispersion of the USSR in
1989-90. With disappearance of the Soviet as well as ‘socialist’ power block,
there has been substantive shifts in terms of international power order and the
notions of ‘international community’ as
well as in the role of the United Nations. Such shifts happened at the level of
ruling ideas and policy framework, international trade, new militarism and
power-blocks and the predominance of multi-national companies as the drivers of
economy and politics in many countries.
The fall of USSR and the economic liberalisation of China created a crisis of ‘socialist’ models in countries,, politics and policy framework. The erstwhile ‘socialist’ countries moved to authoritarian politics and ‘liberal economic’ policy and the dominant knowledge framework of ‘socialist’ discourse got retreated to academic discussions and debates in few universities of few countries. Meanwhile, a new combination of neo-conservative politics and neo-liberal economic policy that emerged during the Reagan-Thatcher era in the American-British knowledge axis got a new unilateral assertion through the ‘Washington Consensus’ to liberalise the world economy and to force the post-colonial countries in Africa, Asia and other parts to open up their market and to embrace the neo-liberal policy framework marketed primarily through the World Bank , IMF and bilateral funding for ‘development’ of the ‘third world’.
While the ‘Washington Consensus’ was a sort of the new capitalist manifesto of the neo-liberal policy framework, the neo-conservatism of the George Bush senior opened up ‘military’ aggression in the ‘middle-eastern world’ of the dominant power-matrix. The international world order from 1989-2007 was primarily driven by the ruling ideas of neo-liberal economy framework and neo-conservative political framework at the national and international level. This hegemonic framework was primarily driven by the unilateral power-matrix controlled by the United States and its Anglo-European subsidiary network. The corollary economic globalisation along with military aggression also created their nemesis and reaction in multiple ways.
The economic crisis and the consequent political crisis in the USA in many ways exposed the dogma of unbridled free-market ideology of neo-liberalism. The increasing shifts in the power-dynamics of the multi-lateral and bilateral donors, and the emergence of the powerful economies outside the Euro-American world made 'Washington' consensus fragile. The emergence of China, India and Brazil as donors for international development also meant that hegemonic role of the donor countries organised under the Development Assistance Commitee of OECD got reduced over a period of time. While there is a persistent recession in most of the countries of Europe, the relatively better economic growth of countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America also meant that the role of international development funding in influencing the policies of the global south got substantially reduced or got annulled in many of the emerging economies. These multiple factors and the economic crisis within the USA and recession in Europe resulted in the decline of the ruling ideas propounded by the rich countries, with the support of the multi-lateral and bi-lateral resources and influence.
The fall of USSR and the economic liberalisation of China created a crisis of ‘socialist’ models in countries,, politics and policy framework. The erstwhile ‘socialist’ countries moved to authoritarian politics and ‘liberal economic’ policy and the dominant knowledge framework of ‘socialist’ discourse got retreated to academic discussions and debates in few universities of few countries. Meanwhile, a new combination of neo-conservative politics and neo-liberal economic policy that emerged during the Reagan-Thatcher era in the American-British knowledge axis got a new unilateral assertion through the ‘Washington Consensus’ to liberalise the world economy and to force the post-colonial countries in Africa, Asia and other parts to open up their market and to embrace the neo-liberal policy framework marketed primarily through the World Bank , IMF and bilateral funding for ‘development’ of the ‘third world’.
While the ‘Washington Consensus’ was a sort of the new capitalist manifesto of the neo-liberal policy framework, the neo-conservatism of the George Bush senior opened up ‘military’ aggression in the ‘middle-eastern world’ of the dominant power-matrix. The international world order from 1989-2007 was primarily driven by the ruling ideas of neo-liberal economy framework and neo-conservative political framework at the national and international level. This hegemonic framework was primarily driven by the unilateral power-matrix controlled by the United States and its Anglo-European subsidiary network. The corollary economic globalisation along with military aggression also created their nemesis and reaction in multiple ways.
The economic crisis and the consequent political crisis in the USA in many ways exposed the dogma of unbridled free-market ideology of neo-liberalism. The increasing shifts in the power-dynamics of the multi-lateral and bilateral donors, and the emergence of the powerful economies outside the Euro-American world made 'Washington' consensus fragile. The emergence of China, India and Brazil as donors for international development also meant that hegemonic role of the donor countries organised under the Development Assistance Commitee of OECD got reduced over a period of time. While there is a persistent recession in most of the countries of Europe, the relatively better economic growth of countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America also meant that the role of international development funding in influencing the policies of the global south got substantially reduced or got annulled in many of the emerging economies. These multiple factors and the economic crisis within the USA and recession in Europe resulted in the decline of the ruling ideas propounded by the rich countries, with the support of the multi-lateral and bi-lateral resources and influence.
b) Multiple-discourses on Democracy and Development
The Anti-globalisation movements in many parts of the world
found expression in terms of responsive politics as well as reactionary trends.
The fall of the Soviet block on the one hand unleashed the third wave of
democracy and many countries turned more democratic and opted for electoral democracy. Multiple streams of resistance to
economic globalisations, increasing inequality and poverty found expressions in
a new phase of civic politics and resistance at the national and international
level. The new aspirations for democratic
governance at the national and international induced the United Nations to play
a mediating role in terms of managing dissent and resistance through a series
of the United Nations Summits on Environment( Rio 1992), Human Rights( Vienna
1993), Women’s Rights( Beijing 1995) and Social Development ( Copenhagen 1996)
and against Racism( Johannesburg 1999).
While the human development approach as well as the new discourse on
Environment, human rights, women’s rights and against racial discrimination
gave a parallel discourse to manage dissent and resistance against the
neo-liberal economic globalisation, it also gave rise to a new civic politics
to challenge and change the unequal and unjust economic globalisation and its consequences to the poor and marginalised sections.
There were three parallel
‘policy and political’ discourses in the international politics for around
fifteen years after the fall of Berlin Wall. The dominant hegemonic discourse( of neo-liberal economic policy, neo-conservative politics and new military aggression) on politics, trade, and militarism was primarily driven by the US and
Euro-Anglican allies, the second discourse to bring a ‘human factor’ to the
power-relationship was led by the United Nations and international
‘development’ community driven by OECD and the third discourse was a resistance
discourse by the new civic politics trying to challenge and change the unequal
and unjust power-matrix at the national and international level. While the
third civil society dissent discourse drew out from the second ‘development’
discourse, the primary inspiration and premises of the civic resistance
politics come from the history of non-conformist politics as well as politics
of dissent at the national and international level. The discourse of human
development and discourse of dissent against aggressive economic globalisation
found expression in the world social forum and was an expression of the
emerging civic politics in the age of information-technology and communication
revolution.
c) Politics of
Militancy
However, the fourth
discourse was primary driven by ‘military aggression’ and counter ‘terrorist’
aggression’ and fuelled by political economy of oil and military-industries in the
‘developed world’. The most reactionary and militant form of discourse against the bulldozing mode of militant cultural globalisation was in the form of violent Islamist politics that propounded a militant form of theocracy. The neo-conservative politics and its corollary of aggressive
militarism of the US and its allies primarily in oil-rich Arab World also
created huge back-lash from the reactionary Islamists politics accompanied
by new militancy that resorted terror
attacks across the world and in the most dramatic the attack on 9/11 against the World Trade Centre and Pentagon.
The Islamist politics and Talibanisation promoted by the US and allies as an ‘anti-dote’ to communism and proxy war against the USSR get morphed in to a violent forms of Islamist politics fuelled by ‘terror’ attack across the world. While in the short-run, the American Economy benefited from the neo-liberal economic globalisation and neo-conservative militarism, in the long run this exhausted the economy and politics of the United States. This over-extension of unilateral power in the international politics and the war fatigue created an economic crises as well as political crisis in the USA. The ascent of Obama, who is ‘outsider’ to the established hegemonic power-matrix of the US, in many ways, signalled the shift in politics at the national and international level.
The Islamist politics and Talibanisation promoted by the US and allies as an ‘anti-dote’ to communism and proxy war against the USSR get morphed in to a violent forms of Islamist politics fuelled by ‘terror’ attack across the world. While in the short-run, the American Economy benefited from the neo-liberal economic globalisation and neo-conservative militarism, in the long run this exhausted the economy and politics of the United States. This over-extension of unilateral power in the international politics and the war fatigue created an economic crises as well as political crisis in the USA. The ascent of Obama, who is ‘outsider’ to the established hegemonic power-matrix of the US, in many ways, signalled the shift in politics at the national and international level.
The post-colonial modes of state formation in Iraq, and other parts of middle-east are facing a crisis. The prolonged war in Iraq, and the military aggression in Libya and the various economic as well as political crises in Syria and other parts Arab World have unleashed new forces of destabilization in the region. One of the reasons for the emergence of militant Islamist armed and aggressive networks in different names is the continuous military aggression that destroyed the traditional power-network of tribal social order and the ‘social contract’ of such tribal power-network with their respective nations state. So this creates both political as well as economic flux in the region.
d) The Shifting
equations of international politics
The economic ascent of China and the shift of economic
growth in the Asian continent and Latin America undermined the unilateral
hegemony of the USA. This year, China has emerged as the largest economy in the
world, pushing the USA in to the second place. Among the top five global
economy three are in Asia (China, India and Japan) and there is only one from Europe
(Germany).The new groupings of emerging economies (India, Brazil, South Africa)
and BRICS( Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) on the one hand
indicate the emergence of a multi-polar world and on the other hand indicates
the decline of the influence of the traditional OECD countries. The shift is
not only in term of economic resources, but also increasing knowledge-networks
and a regional level corporation.
European Economy is going through a prolonged mode of recession and the
American Economy is struggling to keep up with the good old American
Dream.
The United Nations formed in the aftermath of the Second
World War continue to be driven by the international power-matrix of the
‘winning’ side of the Second World War. In a multi-polar world, with a new
power-configuration and new forms of assertions make the United Nations itself
in a flux. While there is a wide-spread
call for ‘reforming’ the United Nations and to go beyond the ‘power control’ of
the five permanent members in the security council, there is an increasing
reluctance to change the organisational politics of United Nation. As a result there are increasing questions about the efficacy of the United Nations
in terms of democracy, development and human rights.
While there is more rhetoric on democracy, the democratic as
well as civic spaces across the world are shrinking. While there are more conferences and
discussions on human rights, there is an increasing violation of human rights
across the world. The increasing violation of human rights, new forms of
politics of exclusion and new forms of subtle and not-so-subtle discrimination
in many countries also unleash new
forms of violence as well as armed networks of various forms against the state.
With the ascent of China, with its authoritarian politics and market- economy,
human rights discourse at the international level may further get .further marginalised.
e) Shifting discourse on democracy and development
In most of the
countries, political parties themselves have been reduced to electoral networks
to capture the power of the state either through subversion or through
propaganda machine. The social and political role of political parties got
annulled as they have become traditional institutional establishments driven and
populated by ‘professional’ career politicians in search of the power of the
government. As a result most of the political parties are conformist
establishments driven by ‘interest networks’ and ‘identity networks’ to manage and
seek personal or institutional aggrandizement of the ‘governmental’ power for
maintaining the socio-economic- political status-quo of the society. The dominant political parties and discourse
often tend to ‘silence’ the opposition through ‘co-option’, ‘consensus’
‘collaboration’ or ‘coercion’. Paradoxically the rhetoric of democracy is often used to kill democratic spaces or to ‘de-democratise’ society and
politics through annulling opposition political spaces and parties and by annihilating the politics of dissent.
The unprecedented urbanisation and the multi-dimensional inequalities within societies and countries and among countries will have political consequences. The increasing economic inequality along with social inequality and identity politics can unleash new cycle of violence and criminalisation in the urban areas. All these indicate a crisis of politics as the national and international level.
The unprecedented urbanisation and the multi-dimensional inequalities within societies and countries and among countries will have political consequences. The increasing economic inequality along with social inequality and identity politics can unleash new cycle of violence and criminalisation in the urban areas. All these indicate a crisis of politics as the national and international level.
With the emergence of neo-conservative political forces in many of the OECD counties, the nature and character of the bilateral and multi-lateral funding would change. The international development framework that emerged in the aftermath of the Second World War and through the Marshall Plan and bilateral funding for ‘development’ in the erstwhile colonies of the European countries would change. The prolonged economic recession in Europe and the resultant ascent of neo-conservative politics in various countries have already reduced the bi-lateral international funding for ‘over-seas development’. One of the outcomes of the Post-2015 Sustainable Development Agenda framework will be cumulative reduction of the bilateral and multi-lateral funding for ‘development and poverty-eradication’.
The international development framework , in many ways, was the outcome of the post-second world-war economic and political order. The post-colonial development model, wherein the erstwhile colonial powers sought to patronise and influence the international politics and trade policies of their former colonies, are no longer valid. Many of the former colonies have now become middle income countries, regional power-blocks and with stronger economies and influence than the old colonial powers.
The substantial reduction of bilateral funding for international development will adversely affect many of the fund-dependent non-governmental development organisations and also many of the United Nations agencies. As a result many of the international development NGOs may have to merge together to survive or develop new ‘business model’ or to disappear in the history. With reduction in funds from the traditional European donor countries, many of the United Nations agencies will be forced to merge and become leaner. Many of the UN Agencies with their headquarters in USA and Europe will be forced to shift their base to China and other countries due to the potential economic crisis in the future.
While there is lot of ‘rhetoric’ against neo-liberal
economic policies, the fact of the matter is that neo-liberal economic policy
is on retreat and in many countries the policy framework is no longer valid.
When there is a persistent crisis of economy or prolonged recession, there is
an increasing chance for the rise of right –wing conservative politics
accompanied by various forms of social fascism.
There is an emergence of neo-conservative politics in Europe, in different parts of Asia as well as in the Americas. There is also increasing social fascism and discrimination against religious and ethnic minorities in different in Europe, Asia, Africa and different parts of the world. There is a new nexus of economic, politic and media elites in many countries and the elite capture of the state apparatus along with new forms of social fascism may unleash new forms of mobilisation, protests and eventually resistance.
There is an emergence of neo-conservative politics in Europe, in different parts of Asia as well as in the Americas. There is also increasing social fascism and discrimination against religious and ethnic minorities in different in Europe, Asia, Africa and different parts of the world. There is a new nexus of economic, politic and media elites in many countries and the elite capture of the state apparatus along with new forms of social fascism may unleash new forms of mobilisation, protests and eventually resistance.
The Ecological crisis, multi-dimensional inequality, the
rise of new militant identity politics, new forms of social fascism, and the
deeper flux in the international politics on the one hand indicate a deeper
crisis in the national and international politics and on the other hand signal
the emergence of a new political theory, perspective and consequent political
action in the 21st century. In the time of flux and crisis, new
imaginations emerge; new possibilities emerge; and new politics also
emerge. Hence, even in the times of
crisis and despair, there is space for new political imagination and new politics of rights, justice, fairness and sustainable future for the human beings and environment.
No comments:
Post a Comment