John Samuel
Political Context and Trends
The emergence of Aam Admi Party ( AAP) is a positive political experiment in its
embryonic stage. It is a significant
development in the Indian political landscape- as its electoral victory
reflects the frustrations and anger of a whole range of people against the
entrenched nexus between economic elites and political elites and consequent
corruption that infected the very body politics of India. It also reflects a
frustration and disdain against the
'career politician' syndrome wherein politics itself is reduced to a career
option to capture and enjoy the power of the state and comforts and
paraphernalia of power within the government or in the shadow of the government
. Idealism within political party praxis began to fade away from the early
eighties and eventually a large number of people joined full time politics with
an ambition to enter electoral politics or to get positions of power in the
government (unlike the generation driven to politics to fight for freedom or
justice or a larger cause) .AAP has also successfully demonstrated how civic politics can get morphed in to
viable electoral politics and
possibilities, even if it is in a limited manner.
It would be worthwhile to highlight some of the trends in
the context of AAP, the DNA of which came from the Anti-corruption movement, led
by the Anna team. Here are the earlier observations that I made in the context of the anti-corruption
movement, which served as a spring board for the AAP.
1) There is little space for the politically aware middle
class to join a political party or mainstream political process as political
parties are still in the old mode, allowing no room for horizontal entry beyond
the usual feeder mechanisms. Even today, in most political parties (except for
the left parties) lineage matters more than political vision, commitment or
grassroots experience. One in every six MPs is there because of his/her family
connections. And many of the political parties go after ‘celebrities’ as a
quick fix to win votes, at the cost of committed party workers or cadres. No
one will be able to tell how Govinda or Hema Malini contributed as MPs or to the parties that offered seats to them! Millionaires and billionaires can buy their way in to Parliament or even control few hundred MPs to bat for their corporate cause
inside or outside the Parliament. Millionaires in our parliament increased
exponentially over the last two decades. So to enter in to inner circles of
established political party establishments, people either needs correct
lineage, or money or muscle or the patronage of cast/community feudal
network. This has alienated large number
of politically conscious middle class and poor people from the political party
process and their role got reduced in to passive voters once in four or five years or consumers of the
inefficient services of government. This has frustrated a large number of
middle class who are more aware about politics and who expect more and better
options in and from party politics and government.
2) The software of Indian politics is changing though the
hardware has not changed. The political and policy process in India has changed
significantly in the last 15 years. There is a new middle class with more
access to knowledge, technology, social networking, income and global exposure.
Modes of power, social legitimation and leadership have changed significantly
in the last 20 years. However, the structural character of the Indian political
party system is still based on a model that emerged in the early-1980s, the
post-Emergency period in Indian politics.
3) Modes of communication determine modes of mobilisation
and also modes of politics in many ways. Look at how the profile of political
leaders has changed with televised political communication. Few have worked
directly with the people or mobilised them at the grassroots. Many have walked
onto the political stage through the TV studios. They are telegenic and
articulate and derive their political legitimacy in the television studios,
though they may not be at ease with the dust and sweat of the road or the noise
of the masses. Many of them have been lawyers or relatively better-educated
members of the urban upper-middle class. Consider Kapil Sibal, Manu Abhishek
Singhvi, P Chidambaram, Jairam Ramesh, Arun Jaitley, Sushma Swaraj, Sitaram
Yechury and Brinda Karat.
Telegenic politics has caused journalism itself to become a
‘performance’ in the TV studios or on the road, eclipsing the old modes of
analytic journalism and nuanced critique. This kind of instant journalism is
all about playing to the moment and performing for an imagined community. Mass
politics has been submerged under this form of media politics. The market and
the media have collided to create an instant ‘sensex’ of politics.
It is here that new-age advocacy actors from the non-party
political/civil space have begun to outsmart the old politicians by performing
media politics and utilising network modes of mobilisation. They are the
telegenic civil society counterparts of the telegenic politicians. They belong to the same class: articulate,
urban, upper-caste middle class. The people were to them largely the means and
not the end of democracy. Rhetoric often preceded the reality of a billion
people. In a world where market, media
and telegenic performance determine political clout, the new civil society too
has learned the art of politics as performance, competing for TRP ratings in
the marketplace of media mediation.
But now in the age of social media and new possibilities of
communications, the name of the game is changing again. Here, the civil society
actors are ahead of the old political class in shaping perceptions of power
through communications. The power of influencing perception has become more
important than the real power of the people on the ground. Politics itself has
been reduced to a ‘virtual’ game in the marketplace of perceptions.
4) When mainstream political parties are reduced to an
electoral network that merely wins or loses elections, other actors fill the
empty political spaces. That is precisely the reason for the relevance and
space of new advocacy networks and organisations -- from KSSP to Narmada
Bachao, to the RTI movement, to the right to work (NREGA) campaign to the
present anti-corruption campaigns. Look at all the key legislations (including
the campaign for political participation of women) in the last 15 years. None
of them came from the mainstream political parties. Most of the demand first
emerged in the political-civil space beyond political parties; then political
parties responded by absorbing the demands into policy agenda. This is bound to
happen when the sole preoccupation of political parties is winning or losing an
election, and then staying in power.
Ideology has taken a backseat -- except in empty slogans and
rhetoric. The politics of electoral convenience has replaced the politics of
conviction. Political opportunism has been elevated to the position of 'smart'
politics -- hiring media experts, advertising professionals, campaign managers,
and slogans coined by copywriters of ad-firms in charge of designing the best
campaigns to grab more seats (by hook or by crook). This is a far cry from the
idealistic politics of the Nehruvian phase in post-independence India.
When ideology (or political vision/mission) is replaced by a
mix of identity- (caste, creed, language) and interest-based electoral arithmetic,
the politics of transformation is reduced to pressure politics and redundant,
‘instant’ rhetoric. It is in such spaces that civil society activism find its
relevance and influence in the mainstream political landscape of India.
5) Whether one likes it or not, the middle class has always
shaped the broader political discourse in India and elsewhere -- from communism
to capitalism to fascism to Hindutva. So
the role of the middle class in Indian politics is not new. Most of the
ideologues and political leaders have come from the Indian middle class, and
largely from the upper-caste.
Anna Hazare happened to be simply a signifier: here the old
idealism met with new modes of mobilisation -- beyond the usual institutional
network of political parties. There is also a message: those in government or
power can no longer simply take the people for granted. And in the age of
social networking, mobilisation and public opinions can also be shaped beyond
mainstream media and mainstream politics. This gives rise to the possibility of
a new politics beyond the electoral games we witness every five years.
6) The rural-urban divide has political implications in
India. In independent India, there have been four major political transitions
-- the end of the 1960s Nehruvian era;
the end of one-party rule following the Emergency; the emergence of telegenic politics in the
1990s and the age of globalisation; and assertive Hindutva competing for the
vote-bank late-’80s onwards. Almost all
of these periods have had an urban middle class link -- even in the case of the
Naxalites -- in shaping the discourse.
7) However, it would be rather simplistic to compare the new
social network-based mobilisation of the urban middle classes to the Gandhian
mode of political struggles for freedom against colonialism and imperialism.
Politics against injustice, oppression and domination preceded the methods of
Gandhi. Gandhian methods did not define his politics. His politics and ethics
shaped his choice of methods and communication. Gandhi’s politics was the
politics of the masses and not the politics of the mass media. Gandhi worked
and lived with the people, listened to them, educated and empowered them and
spent a lifetime experimenting with his ideas and methods, without compromising
the ideal of transformation. Gandhi sought to transform politics, not transcend
politics.
Here, in the media-driven performance of Team Anna, method
preceded politics. This was the politics of instant performance, seeking to
influence the perceptions of a particular class, rather than a mass politics to
challenge and change the situation. It sought to transcend politics rather than
transform politics. It sought to create
symbols devoid of substance. It is
interesting to note how Team Anna team played to the needs of the media market.
The protest performance began with the
backdrop of an image of Bharat Mata (Mother India), appealing to upper-caste
Hindu sentiments, and when this was criticised for its saffron leanings, the
backdrop was changed to an elegantly designed photograph of Gandhiji with the charkha, and the waving of the
national flag to ‘nationalise’ and ‘secularise’ the performance of the fast.
This colourful performance of protest, where Kiran Bedi played the cheerleader
on the ‘stage’ and Anna pretended to be Gandhi was a spectacle of politics
aimed at the media. The masses became simply a means to show power rather than
the real source of power. This was a mockery of Gandhian principles, practise
and methods of politics. The media followed Gandhi’s politics. Here the
politics of performance followed the media.
9) Anna was just a symbol in a campaign primarily promoted
by Delhi-centric upper-caste and middle class actors. Anna, an ex-army man from
rural India of the jai jawan-jai kisan variety with a bit of the Gandhian touch
and grassroots NGO background, was set against an urban backdrop, with mass
media filling in the gaps: Anna symbolised the ‘old’ India onscreen, and young
India was represented by the youth on the streets, the whole performance
televised. Kiran Bedi put up a good performance for the media, of the elite,
post-retirement ‘civil service’ transiting into ‘civil society’. ‘Civil society’ itself became a residual
space for the new elites to find their niche within the media mediations.
Bollywood star Aamir Khan added the celebrity quotient to the new ‘civil
society’ performers manufactured by the media.
You have to admit it was a smart experiment in new modes of
advocacy campaigning -- making strategic use of symbols (Anna too was one),
media and networking. This was not a political struggle or a Satyagraha of
Gandhian politics. It was a smart, urban-based advocacy campaign. Though there
are many interesting lessons to learn from it, India Against Corruption’s
campaign cannot be compared with the salt satygraha or even the anti-Emergency
campaign.
The Potentials and
challenges for AAP
1) Revitalizing and redefining politics and
democratic experiment.
I consider AAP experiment as a continuation of the earlier
political process that challenged the established power-cartels in the late
1960s, during the JP Movement, during the initial years of BSP and also in the
early nineties. None of them survived as broad political movement- though parts
of such movements got absorbed by the establishment and they themselves became
establishment. However, these movements played an important political role to
revitalize and redefine the Indian democratic process and experiments. In that
sense, AAP is a positive political experiment that would force the existing
political party establishment to rethink their politics and approach and
eventually revitalize the Indian democratic experiment. I would argue that
Indian democratic experiment survived for more than six decades because of the
politics of dissent and organisation of protests and frustrations within the
framework of democratic electoral politics. So I will not be dismissive or be
cynical about the AAP political process.
2) Bandwagon Syndrome
While AAP has some
credible leaders, it also attracts a whole range of actors, including the
residues /disgruntled elements from the political party system and also a whole
range of people with multiple personal, political and ideological agenda and
persuasion- ranging from right wing to left wing .This bandwagon syndrome on
the one hand reflect the new enthusiasm of the people to go beyond the rather
sterile and closed political party structures and interest-networks within
those political parties However, this
bandwagon syndrome will also trigger the ideological and internal contradictions
within the DNA of AAP. To mediate and negotiate multiple interests and
ideological persuasions any party needs clear institutional capacity and
process and also a coherent and collective sense of leadership and vision beyond
the bandwagon syndrome. That is what history taught us. As of now AAP does not
have any filtering mechanism. All sorts of actors (from RSS, BJP background to
new left or social movements) are all jumping in to the bandwagon, more as a reaction to the frustrating experience
from the established political parties. There is a distinction between politics
as a proactive choice and politics as a reactive choice. Now the
bandwagon syndrome is indicative of a 'reactive'
political choice. If AAP has not won Delhi election, many of those who join
AAP now would have been ridiculing the formation.
3) Quick-Fix Solutions?
It is too early to predict its political trajectory and
viability as the Pan-Indian reality is different from the urban-centric
perspective or political locations. Politics is as much as local, regional,
linguistics and global. And large number of aam admi live in rural India and
belong to Dalits, Adivasies, minorities and marginalised communities and those
who live with less than 100 rupees a day. While it is rather easy to get
excited over face book, social networks or TV, the real India still lives in
villages, beyond social networks and urban conclaves.. And it requires years of
political work and commitment beyond the ‘quick-fix’ solutions to politicise
and historicise the Indian democratic and political process. BSP took more than twenty years. BJP( in its
post Jansangh) form ( and in-spite of the RSS structural support) took more
than twenty five years to make viable presence- and even now BJP is not a pan-Indian
party. So while AAP is a good experiment, it is too early to say that in its
present trajectory beyond the urban centres, whether it has a potential to
transform politics in a sustainable manner
4) Umbrella
party?
AAP itself got such a
visibility because it was a 'Delhi-centric' experiment, where it was much
easier for the 'national media' and 'international media' to cover. If AAP
happened in a north-eastern state or in a relatively marginalised state, it
would not have had such a visibility. If you ask about an umbrella party with
multiple interests and multiple ideological spectrums, Congress is already
established, where there are indeed multi-vocal voices as well as inbuilt
mechanism for dissent and negotiating dissent. However, Congress Party ( like
most of other parties) have become victim of the decay within, and the rather entrenched network of interests,
identity and corporate agenda at the cost of the original ideals and idea of
Gandhi, Nehru or the first generation congress leaders who fought for freedom
and justice. And it is in this context
of dissolving of the ‘congress system’ that AAP as a political process emerge
and tend to fill in that space, even if temporarily. As of now AAP does not have a coherent,
cohesive or collective sense of leadership and broad political imagination that
can capture the imagination of 1.2 billion Indians.
5) Media mediations and competing cult
syndrome?
As of now Aravind
Kejariwal faces the predicament of being reduced to a ‘cult’ figure in line
with the ‘mediated’ media image competing with Narendra Modi and Rahul Gandhi.
This ‘image’ mediation and competing ‘cult’ in the media based on Face Book
hits and twitter followers do not transform politics on the ground. And the key challenge for AAP leadership will
be to
outgrow the ‘cult-syndrome’ and ‘bandwagon’ syndrome. And also how to move beyond ‘reactive’ political spaces to a ‘proactive’ political space with a large vision for all the people of the country as well as how to make the promises of the Indian constitution real for everyone in India. This requires a more coherent and cohesive political imagination, a pan-Indian leadership cutting across cast, creed ,gender and class. The challenge is more than winning an election. The challenge is whether such an experiment can transform the very body politics of India to really democratise politics in an inclusive manner with a sense of mission and vision.
outgrow the ‘cult-syndrome’ and ‘bandwagon’ syndrome. And also how to move beyond ‘reactive’ political spaces to a ‘proactive’ political space with a large vision for all the people of the country as well as how to make the promises of the Indian constitution real for everyone in India. This requires a more coherent and cohesive political imagination, a pan-Indian leadership cutting across cast, creed ,gender and class. The challenge is more than winning an election. The challenge is whether such an experiment can transform the very body politics of India to really democratise politics in an inclusive manner with a sense of mission and vision.
I am generally
positive to this political experiment
though I am less inclined to jump in to a bandwagon, due to any ‘reactive’
reasons. The question is whether AAP
will be able to transform the frustration and anger of people in to a cohesive
and coherent political party with clear programme and ethical leadership and
with an ability to move beyond politics of protest to politics of viable
proposals and clear political agenda for empowering more than a
billion aam admies on the ground.
The term Aam Admi is taken from an old slogan of the good
old congress party. Ironically the slogan still remains a slogan. And the
question is what it takes to transform a slogan in to real politics on the
ground, fulfilling the unfulfilled promises of the Indian constitution and
Freedom to the large majority of ordinary people living in the invisible
villages and congested slums of India. One can only hope that the embryo AAP
will give birth to a healthy new generation of leadership and political process
and not another example of a still born baby of dead promises. The challenge is
on and I still remain optimist about Indian democracy and politics.