John Samuel
Corruption is primarily about abuse or misuse of power for personal aggrandisement or vested interests in society or institutions; from local to the global. Hence, the practice and process of corruption is deeply political. The word ‘corrupt’ is derived from the Latin root ‘corruptus’, past participle of’ corrumpere-’ to mean abuse or destroy and when used as an adjective it denotes means ‘utterly broken’.
The subversion, misuse and abuse of power have systemic and socio-historical manifestations in different contexts. This has to do with the way power is institutionalised and internalised in a given society, with a particular cultural and political history. For example, the political elite of South Asia often demonstrate the embedded feudalism and cumulative hierarchies (through cast system) internalised within the collective memory of the society. So the one common defining political aspect of South Asia is that all power-elites in most of the South Asian Countries (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, and Afghanistan) operate through family network and, cast/identity networks to acquire and maintain power. Such internalised ‘order of power’ tends to undermine the process and content of democratic process itself. Though political parties play a cardinal role in the democratic process of a country, the irony is that political parties themselves have least of internal democracy or accountability. And in many cases, political parties are reduced to institutionalised forms of ‘interest’ network to capture and control the power of the state. In many countries in Africa, the use and abuse of power can also linked to the internalisation of power in the form of ‘tribal’ hierarchies and identities.
So it is important to understand the causes and consequence of ‘corruption’ within the history of the institutionalisation and internalisation power, the nature and character of the power elites and in terms of social and economic inequalities within a given society. The political economy of corruption is primarily about the nexus between the economic, social and political elites in a given society to subvert, misuse, abuse or misappropriates institutions, policies and systems for the vested interests or, private gains of a privileged group or set of individuals embedded in the dominant power-structure of a country. The unholy nexus between the business elites, political elites and media elites in managing the economic, political and natural resources of a given country is a global trend across the world; from the richest country to the poorest country. Various studies indicate that the worldwide bribery alone is estimated to involve over 1 trillion US dollars annually.
The ongoing economic crisis exposed the depth and breadth of the role of corporate elites and the missionaries of finance capitalism in shaping the policy and political agenda even in the so-called democracies of the world. When the cyclone hit the Wall Street in 2008, it exposed the unholy nexus between the capital fund managers of the Wall Street and the mandarins in the corridors of political power: the entrenched ‘partnership’ between the rich and those who are ‘democratically’ elected to ‘run’ the government. Such unholy systemic power nexus between the economic and political elites of a country is at the root of entrenched political and institutional corruption in many countries. A state of unbridled political and economic corruption is known as a ‘kleptocracy’, literally meaning "rule by thieves". The cumulative impact of such unholy nexus of corrupt practices and instances is the erosion of the legitimacy of the state. The rather spontaneous mobilization of ordinary people across the world from New York to New Delhi, from London to Lisbon, from Rome to Rio and on the streets of Egypt, Tunis, Yemen, Syria, and India and all over the world has one thing in common: all of them questioned the legitimacy of the governments and in many cases the character of the state and all of them demand accountability from the leaders, the state as well as market.
Though corruption does have a moral, theological and philosophic connotations, it is important to analyse and address corruption in relation to political system, dominant economic power relations and culture of internalised power. The manifestations and forms of corruption may include bribery, extortion, cronyism, nepotism, patronage, graft, and embezzlement. While corruption may facilitate criminal enterprise such as drug trafficking, money laundering, and human trafficking, it is not restricted to these activities. The legality and illegality of a particular act of corruption or abuse of power may differ depending on the ‘jurisdiction’ of a country. In some countries, certain political funding practices are legal, but may be illegal in another country. In many countries, government officials have broad or poorly defined powers, which make it difficult to distinguish between legal and illegal actions.
While the cause of corruption is to do with misuse and abuse of political and systemic power, the consequences of corruption are many. Corruption undermines the effectiveness, legitimacy and accountability of institutions and governments. Corruption does siphon off money meant for social and economic development of a country. Corruption breeds on entrenched socio-economic inequality and further increase the gap between the rich and the poor, and the powerful and the marginalized. In the political arena, it undermines democracy and governance by flouting or even subverting formal processes. Corruption in elections and in legislative bodies undermines accountability and distorts the representation in policymaking; corruption in the judiciary undermines the rule of law; and corruption in administration results in the inefficient provision of services. Corruption violates a basic principle of centrality of civic virtue. The net result is that corruption undermines the value of democratic governance and erodes the institutional legitimacy and capacity of government to deliver services, ensure security of citizens and to deliver socio-economic development.
In the last twenty years, anti-corruption initiatives have become a part of the governance and development discourse across the world. With the paradigm shift in the information and communication technology, it has become impossible to keep corrupt practices under the veil of secrecy and silence, either in the form of a controlled state media or suppressing the voices of dissent. The neo-liberal economic paradigm of free market capitalism and the economic globalization unleashed new power matrix in many of the countries, particularly those countries with a big market size( like India, China) or those countries with big natural resources( Nigeria, Sudan etc). Such corrupt nexus has a dimension of geo-politics as well as political economy of aid, trade and debt. It is not an accident of history most of the conflicts in Africa or Asia are fought with small weapons illegally exported by the big companies in Europe. It is also not an accident of history that most of the entrenched conflicts happen in countries with rich natural resources.
It is not an accident of history that the companies and the banks that benefit from the illicit flow of finance happened to be in some of the richest countries in the world. Illicit financial flows indicate the transfer of money earned through illegal activities such as corruption, transactions involving contraband goods, criminal activities, and efforts to shelter wealth from a country’s tax authorities. It is estimated that at an average more than US$ 1 trillion is transferred from the poor countries to rich countries in the form of illicit flow of funds. Illicit flow of finance from African countries is estimated to be around US$ 25 billion per year. It is also pointed out that for every dollar received as economic assistance or aid, around ten dollar is transferred from the poor countries to rich countries in the form of illicit financial flow. It is irony of our times that the very same countries that host the big companies and banks that benefit from the illicit flow of finance also preach to the ‘third world’ about the need to ‘fight’ corruption. So corruption has its local, national and international ramifications.
Reducing corruption to petty bribery without challenging the extremely corrupt system at the heart of the political economy at the national and international level would be equivalent to consuming aspirin tablet to fight a heart disease. However, the globalization of information and technology also helped to expose corruption in an unprecedented way. The social networks and new media could expose corrupt practices conveniently put under the carpet by the media and market elites in connivance with the political elites.
It is in recognition of the widespread instances of corruption across the world, the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) was adopted on 31st October 2003. UNCAC is the first legally binding international anti-corruption instrument. In its 8 Chapters and 71 Articles, the UNCAC obliges its States Parties to implement a wide and detailed range of anti-corruption measures affecting their laws, institutions and practices. These measures aim to promote the prevention, criminalization and law enforcement, international cooperation, asset recovery, technical assistance and information exchange, and mechanisms for implementation. The UNCAC is ratified or approved by 154 countries and European Union. In spite of the approval or ratification of UNCAC, the biggest challenge is that lack of implementation of the principles and provisions of UNCAS in the national context due to absence of effective laws or independent anti-corruption commissions to make them work.
In the context of the political economy of aid and governance, there has been effort to export a successful model of anti-corruption from western liberal democratic context to other countries in Asia and Africa. However, such measures did not work due to the fact that context of the internalization; institutionalization and culture of power are very different from the European context. In a recent book ‘Making the State Responsive’ (UNDP w 2011): Goran Hyden and John Samuel) we have made the following observation:
“Institutional innovations have typically come from external sources in the form of transfers from societies in which these institutions have evolved over long time. The Ombudsman institution found in the Nordic countries is one of these exports. It has been adopted quite successfully in countries that already have a tradition of rule of law, and where independent scrutiny of those in power is taken for granted. It has been much less successful in countries where particularistic values still prevail and the notion of universal norms is only weakly institutionalized. Transfers to these countries have typically ended as half-measures, for example when the ombudsman institution reports to the Presidency rather than the Parliament, rendering checks on the executive ineffective. The establishment of these institutions may not have been wholly unsuccessful, as the possibility exists in the future that groups of citizens will demand their independence and accountability from the legislature rather than the executive, but it is questionable whether these half-measures qualify as ‘good enough’ governance. There is evidence from a number of countries – Brazil, India, Mongolia, and South Africa – that institutional innovations spring out of hardship. Learning how to achieve something comes with the urge to change the status quo. Claiming the state, therefore, is very much a matter of challenging public institutions, whether national or sub-national, from below or within, to ensure adherence to norms and principles of equity in service delivering. Institutional innovations that help citizens to better monitor and measure government performance are important, but there are no shortcuts. Evolving such institutions, as the case study on India convincingly shows, are associated with political battles. Not all are won”
While a strong anti-corruption law, to a certain extent , can control or reduce the petty corruption or instances of bribery or ‘speed money’ /‘protection money’ at the lower level of bureaucracy( particularly police, land registration, public works departments), the real cancer of corruption operate at the heart of the political system in India and elsewhere.
In the South Asian context, one of the major systemic causes of corruption is the subversion of the political party system and electoral process. In the post independence era, the legitimacy of the political party system and that of the state was relatively higher. Hence, it was relatively easier to collect individual contributions from the ordinary members of the party or general public. However, in the last thirty years, the political party system itself got corpotorised, often controlled by the family or cast/identity network. While the cadre of the political parties got dissolved from below, the visibility and the ‘out-reach’ mechanism of the political parties were outsourced through costly advertising campaign, media ‘management’ and ‘image’ mangers from the public relations companies. When the cadre got dwindled on the ground, the institutional structures of political parties took precedence over the mass politics. ‘Mass’ was to ‘demonstrate’- in rallies ‘outsourced’ to the local leaders- with money and muscles. The degeneration of the political party systems in terms of the erosion of democratic values within and in terms of the instrumental use of ‘mass’ as the ‘muscle’ to ‘demonstrate’ or as ‘vote’ banks coincided with the increasing corporate control of the political parties.
When it has become difficult to raise financial resources from the cadre of the political parties, the new fund-managers of the political parties build new nexus with the new corporate elites in the neo-liberal era. The new corporate elites of multinational corporations and big Indian companies scrambling for ‘market share’ – also took ‘political share’ by ‘investing’ in various political parties and leaders. A percentage of the corporate budget as ‘miscellaneous’ items or ‘charity’ found their way to the coffers of political parties and leaders. They have in turn provided tax rebates, new policies helpful for one or other companies, or helping them to acquire land and resources. The new economic elites ‘invested’ in political parties, political leaders, elections as well as media. The Nira Radia tapes dramatically exposed this unholy nexus at the heart of the political and policies process in the so-called largest democracy in the world. Political Parties in turn ‘invested’ in ‘media companies and campaigns’ and market research groups to get ‘favourable’ poll result.
The media-market nexus of subverting electoral process has become complete through the ‘outsourced’ poll- using the methods of market survey to determine the ‘mood’ of the country or ‘legitimacy’ of its leaders. As a result media became the midwife to strengthen the unholy nexus of the political, policy and corporate elites in a country. In the absence of real mass politics and erosion of cadre party politics, the political leaders resorts to new tactics like ‘Radha Yathra’ to attract the attention of the media and the masses. The very term ‘Radham’- or chariot denotes ‘power’ of the King. When the political leaders began to think and act like ‘Kings’- they can at best be benevolent patrons and at worst be corrupts pimps in the corridors of power.
The health of political Parties and electoral process are the most important markers of healthy democracy. Hence it is crucial to maintain the health of these two necessary factors in sustaining a democratic process. The cancer of corruption is actually eating in to the heart of a democratic political system. And erosion of the legitimacy of such a system can be detrimental to the very viability and sustainability of democracy itself. This was evident in the context of Bangladesh, when Army stepped in with ‘appointed’ civil government to ‘fight corruption’ at the cost of democracy.
The political parties and electoral systems need to be more transparent and accountable. The decoupling of the interests of business elites and political parties are imperative for the sustainability of democracy in India and elsewhere. The funding for political parties and elections need to be transparent and accountable. At the heart of the problem is increasing lack of accountability in political system, media, big corporation and even NGOs. The Right to Accountability should be an integral part of the Right to democratic Governance.
Friday, October 28, 2011
Tuesday, September 20, 2011
Sunday, August 28, 2011
Politics as Performance and spectacle : The relevance and irrelevance of the Anna mode of advocacy
John Samuel
One of the positive outcomes of the recent mobilisation for the Lokpal-bill to challenge corruption at various levels of government is that it has revitalised the political debates in India, particularly among the 'apolitical' class. Though in terms of substantive demands, the Anna-team did not achieve anything new (as they simply changed the goal post, climbing down from their earlier demands); they succeeded in putting 'corruption' at the centre of political discourse. They also showed the possibilities for new politics.
The ongoing debates and discussions in the cyber space, in media, in the drawing rooms and in public spaces in a way signify the relevance of social mobilisations- in support of the campaign against corruption. It is the political debates about the nature and character of 'representative democracy', the new modes of mobilisation and the relevance( or irrelevance) of the 'old' left in new India etc that are more interesting than the advocacy campaign itself.
It is indicative of a political trend- beyond a mere 'storm in urban tea-cup'. Here are ten broad observations on some of the aspects of the changing trends.
1) There is less space for politically aware middle class to join a political party or mainstream political process- as the political parties are still in the old mode with less space for horizontal entry beyond the usual feeder mechanism. Even now in most of the political parties (except for the Left Parties) the lineage matters more than the political vision or commitment or grassroots experience. One in every six of MPs is there because of his/her family connections rather the political experience or commitment.
2) Software of Indian politics is changing though the hardware has not changed. The political and policy process in India has changed significantly in the last fifteen years. There is a new middle class with more access to knowledge, technology, social networking, income and global exposure. The modes of power, social legitimation and leadership have changed significantly in the last twenty years. However, the structural character of the Indian political party system is still based on a model that emerged in the early 1980s; in the post-emergency period in of the Indian politics.
3) The modes of communications determine the modes of mobilisation and modes of politics in many ways. Look at how the profile of the political leaders changed during the televised modes of political communications. Hardly anyone of them have worked directly with people or mobilised them at the grassroots. They walked to the political central stage through the TV studios. They have been telegenic- articulate – and their core communicative competence was more evident in the Television studios; they derived their political legitimacy in the television studios or they came ‘live’ in front of active TV cameras, though they may not be at ease with the dust and sweat of the road or the noises of the masses . Many of them have been lawyers or relatively better educated from the urban upper middle class and cast. The emergence of Kapil Sibal, Manu Abishek Singhvi, Chidambaram, Jayaram Ramesh, Arun Jetly, Sushma swaraj, Sitaram Yetchury or Brinda Karat- is indicative of the faces of the 'telegenic' phase of the Indian politics. In the telgenic phase of politics, journalism itself became an instant ‘performance’ of mono-act or drama on the TV studios or on the road, rather than the old modes of analytical journalism or nuanced critique.
The telegenic media politics and the ‘instant’ journalism of performing actors was all about playing for the ‘moment’ and performing for an ‘imagined’ community. Mass politics was submerged under the ‘media politics’ – like the fast food chains that provided ‘instant’ gratification. Market and media collided to create instant ‘sensex’ of politics. It is here that the new age advocacy actors from the non-party political-civil space began to ‘outsmart’ the old politicians by performing the media politics and network modes of mobilisation. They were the telegenic ‘civil society’ counter-parts to the ‘smart’ politicians who walked to the centre stage through the television performance. They belonged to the same class: articulate urban upper cast middle class. People were largely ‘means’ to them rather than the ‘end’ of democracy. Rhetoric often preceded the reality of a billion people. In a world where market, media and telegenic performance determined the political ‘clout’, the new ‘civil society’ too learned the art of playing to ‘instant’ politics as performance: competing for the TRP rating in the market place of the media mediation of manufactoring perceptions.
But now in the age of social media - and new possibilities of communications, the name of the game is changing again. Here, the ‘civil society’ actors are ahead of the old political class in terms of the ‘communication’ game of shaping perception of power. Power of influencing perception became more important than the real power of the people on the ground. Politics itself was reduced to ‘virtual’ game in the market place of perceptions.
4) When mainstream political parties get reduced to electoral network to merely win or lose elections, other actors take the political spaces beyond the periodic winning or losing elections. That is precisely the reasons for the relevance and space of new advocacy networks and organisations: from KSSP, to Narmada Bachao, to RTI movement, to Right to work( NREGA) campaign to the present anti-corruption campaigns. Look at all the key legislations (including the campaign for political participation of women) in the last fifteen years. None of them came from the mainstream political parties Most of the demand first emerged in the political-civil space beyond the political parties and then political parties 'responded' by absorbing them in to the policy agenda. And this happens when the sole preoccupation of political parties end up as 'winning or losing ' an election.
Ideology took a back seat - except in the empty slogans and rhetoric. Interest of the leaders (in capturing power of the state) often took a front seat. Politics of electoral convenience often replaced the politics of conviction. Political opportunism itself was elevated in to 'smart' politics- hiring 'media' experts, advertising professionals, 'campaign' managers- and slogans often coined by the copy-writers of the ad-firms in charge of 'designing' the best 'campaigns' to earn more seats( by hook or crook). This is a far cry from the politics of the ideals and ideas of the Nehruvian phase in the post independent India.
When ideology (or political vision or mission) gets replaced by a mix of identity (cast, creed, language ) and 'interest' based electoral arithmetic, the real politics of transformation simply fail to go beyond the 'pressure' politics and redundant rhetoric played for the moment. It is in such spaces that civil society activism find its relevance and influence in the mainstream political landscape of India.
5) Whether one likes it or not, middle class always shaped the broader political discourse in India or elsewhere- from communism to capitalism to fascism to Hindutva. So the role of middle class in the Indian politics is nothing new. Most of the ideologues and political leaders came from the ‘great’ Indian middle class- and largely from the upper cast.
Anna Hazare happened to be simply a signifier: here the old symbols of 'ideals' met with new modes of mobilisation- beyond the usual institutional network of political parties. There is also a message: those in government or power can no longer simply take people for granted. And in the age of social networking- mobilisation and public opinions can also be shaped beyond the mainstream media and mainstream politics. There is the possibility of a new politics beyond ‘winning’ elections every five years and enjoying the stay in the corridors of the state power.
6) The rural-urban divide has political implications in India. In the post-independent India, there has been four major political transitions- (towards the end of 60s the end of Nehruvian era-; the end 70s- the end of congress period- and one party rule in post-emergency phase ; the end 80s- the emergence of the telegenic politics in the age of globalisation, and assertive Hindutva competing for vote bank. All these periods were marked by various degrees of political expressions and modes of mobilisation. Almost all of them had an urban middle class link- even in the case of Naxals- in shaping the discourse.
7) However, it would be rather simplistic to compare the new social- network based mobilisation of the urban middle class to the Gandhian mode of political struggles for freedom against colonialism and imperialism. Politics against injustice, oppression and domination preceded the methods of Gandhi. Gandhian methods did not define his politics. His politics and ethics shaped his choice of methods and communication. Gandhi’s politics was the politics of the masses- and not the politics of the mass media. Gandhi worked and lived with people, listened to them, educated and empowered them- and spent a life time experimenting with his ideas and methods, without compromising the ideals for transformation. Gandhi sought to transform politics and not to transcend politics.
Here, in the case of the media –driven performance of the Anna team, method preceded the politics. It was more of the politics of instant performance, seeking to influence perceptions of a particular class, rather than a mass politics to challenge and change the situation. It sought to ‘transcend’ politics rather than transforming politics. It sought to create symbols devoid of substance. It is interesting to note that how Anna team sought to play around with symbols of ‘convenience’ playing to the need of the media market. The performance of protest began in the backdrop the ‘bharat-matha’ ( mother India), appealing to the upper cast ‘Hindu’ sentiments- and then shifted to the use of an elegantly designed photograph of Gandhi with ‘Charkha’ and waving the tri-coloure national flag to ‘nationalise’ and ‘secularise’ the performance of a fast. A colourful performance of protest, where Kiran Bidi played the Cheer leader on the ‘stage’ and Anna pretended to be Gandhi was a spectacle of a performance as an instant politics meant for the media. Masses became simply a means to ‘show off’ the power- rather than the real source of power. Hence, it was a mockery of Gandhian principles, practise and methods of politics. In Gandhian case, media followed his politics. In this case, the politics of performance followed the media.
9) Anna was more of symbol in a campaign- primarily promoted by the Delhi-centric upper cast and middle class-actors. The anomaly of Anna ( an ex-army man from rural India of ‘jai-jawan- jai kisan variety, with a bit of Gandhian touch and grassroots NGO background) in the urban-back drop and mass media provided the combination of a seeming ‘ideal’ with combination of instant networking. Anna symbolised the ‘old’ India, and the young India was performed by the ‘youth’ on the street- all televised instantly as the performance of a spectacle, with the corallarly drama created in the TV studios. Kiran Bedi performed for the media- the spectacle of the elite post-retirement ‘civil servant’ transiting in to ‘civil society’'activist' in search of the TV cameras. ‘Civil society’ itself became a residual space for the new elites to find their space within the media mediations. The Bollywood and the ‘Lagan’ fame Amir Khan added a celebrity flavour to the new ‘civil society’ celebrities manufactured by the media.
It was indeed a smart experiment in the new mode of advocacy campaign - making strategic use of symbols ( Anna too was one), media and networking. And it was not a 'political struggle'- or a Satyagraha of Gandhian politics. It was an example of smart urban-based advocacy campaign. Though there are many interesting lessons to learn from it - it can't be compared with a political struggle of salt sataygraha or even the anti-emergency campaign.
How can a bill made by a team of four or five people, making a rather tall claim of a 'people's (or Jan) Lokpal bill? They hardly consulted or discussed with people on the ground in a diverse country of more than a billion people. They sought to connect with people through media, rather than the other way around. And of course, there were also characters in the Anna team (from soft saffron to those who were looking for 'celebrity' spot on the TV) who got them excited by their voice and sight in the TV- and them performed-waving the national flag- for the TV crew, ever hungry for the next spectacle. Their protest was indeed significant and it is indicative of the transition, even though it is of instant transitory type of politics of protest.
10) While I think the mobilisation is indicative of a trend, I do not agree with the content and modes of Anna team- particularly its tall claim of ‘second freedom struggle’ or mass-based politics. Bringing thousands of people on the few streets of few cities of India, through media and networking- is not a substitute for the substantive politics in a country of more than 1.2 billion of people.
In a parliamentary democracy, the role of parliament is cardinal. Political parties are the main political force in the country that sustains the health of a representative system of democracy. I also think there are a large number of committed and aware politicians with a sense of integrity. Just because a section of politicians and political party system is corrupt - does not mean that the political class - as a whole - is corrupt.
While it may be important to challenge and influence those who hold power- of the state, it is also important to recognise the limitations of 'quick-fix' seven day wonders of televised mobilisation. Because such advocacy campaign can simply create illusions of politics when actually such 'televised' quick-fix mobilisation can undermine the real political or democratic struggles on the ground. And the campaign for the so-called 'Jan' lokpal bill was an example of a relatively successful advocacy campaign for a policy change, and not an example of a political struggle for freedom or against injustice. )
The ongoing phase of politics is indicative of a political transition. The politics in India in the next ten years may be dramatically different - in terms of modes of mobilisation, composition of leadership and the issues that would come up. So the mode of mobilisation of those who are born in the eighties is indicative of a bigger shift. The anti-corruption campaign just happened to be a space to voice a discontent with the mainstream political party process in India- where the lineage matters more than the real politics. If the political parties do not change their hardware and present modes of operation, many of them would not be able to mobilise people beyond the elction season,in the years to come
One of the positive outcomes of the recent mobilisation for the Lokpal-bill to challenge corruption at various levels of government is that it has revitalised the political debates in India, particularly among the 'apolitical' class. Though in terms of substantive demands, the Anna-team did not achieve anything new (as they simply changed the goal post, climbing down from their earlier demands); they succeeded in putting 'corruption' at the centre of political discourse. They also showed the possibilities for new politics.
The ongoing debates and discussions in the cyber space, in media, in the drawing rooms and in public spaces in a way signify the relevance of social mobilisations- in support of the campaign against corruption. It is the political debates about the nature and character of 'representative democracy', the new modes of mobilisation and the relevance( or irrelevance) of the 'old' left in new India etc that are more interesting than the advocacy campaign itself.
It is indicative of a political trend- beyond a mere 'storm in urban tea-cup'. Here are ten broad observations on some of the aspects of the changing trends.
1) There is less space for politically aware middle class to join a political party or mainstream political process- as the political parties are still in the old mode with less space for horizontal entry beyond the usual feeder mechanism. Even now in most of the political parties (except for the Left Parties) the lineage matters more than the political vision or commitment or grassroots experience. One in every six of MPs is there because of his/her family connections rather the political experience or commitment.
2) Software of Indian politics is changing though the hardware has not changed. The political and policy process in India has changed significantly in the last fifteen years. There is a new middle class with more access to knowledge, technology, social networking, income and global exposure. The modes of power, social legitimation and leadership have changed significantly in the last twenty years. However, the structural character of the Indian political party system is still based on a model that emerged in the early 1980s; in the post-emergency period in of the Indian politics.
3) The modes of communications determine the modes of mobilisation and modes of politics in many ways. Look at how the profile of the political leaders changed during the televised modes of political communications. Hardly anyone of them have worked directly with people or mobilised them at the grassroots. They walked to the political central stage through the TV studios. They have been telegenic- articulate – and their core communicative competence was more evident in the Television studios; they derived their political legitimacy in the television studios or they came ‘live’ in front of active TV cameras, though they may not be at ease with the dust and sweat of the road or the noises of the masses . Many of them have been lawyers or relatively better educated from the urban upper middle class and cast. The emergence of Kapil Sibal, Manu Abishek Singhvi, Chidambaram, Jayaram Ramesh, Arun Jetly, Sushma swaraj, Sitaram Yetchury or Brinda Karat- is indicative of the faces of the 'telegenic' phase of the Indian politics. In the telgenic phase of politics, journalism itself became an instant ‘performance’ of mono-act or drama on the TV studios or on the road, rather than the old modes of analytical journalism or nuanced critique.
The telegenic media politics and the ‘instant’ journalism of performing actors was all about playing for the ‘moment’ and performing for an ‘imagined’ community. Mass politics was submerged under the ‘media politics’ – like the fast food chains that provided ‘instant’ gratification. Market and media collided to create instant ‘sensex’ of politics. It is here that the new age advocacy actors from the non-party political-civil space began to ‘outsmart’ the old politicians by performing the media politics and network modes of mobilisation. They were the telegenic ‘civil society’ counter-parts to the ‘smart’ politicians who walked to the centre stage through the television performance. They belonged to the same class: articulate urban upper cast middle class. People were largely ‘means’ to them rather than the ‘end’ of democracy. Rhetoric often preceded the reality of a billion people. In a world where market, media and telegenic performance determined the political ‘clout’, the new ‘civil society’ too learned the art of playing to ‘instant’ politics as performance: competing for the TRP rating in the market place of the media mediation of manufactoring perceptions.
But now in the age of social media - and new possibilities of communications, the name of the game is changing again. Here, the ‘civil society’ actors are ahead of the old political class in terms of the ‘communication’ game of shaping perception of power. Power of influencing perception became more important than the real power of the people on the ground. Politics itself was reduced to ‘virtual’ game in the market place of perceptions.
4) When mainstream political parties get reduced to electoral network to merely win or lose elections, other actors take the political spaces beyond the periodic winning or losing elections. That is precisely the reasons for the relevance and space of new advocacy networks and organisations: from KSSP, to Narmada Bachao, to RTI movement, to Right to work( NREGA) campaign to the present anti-corruption campaigns. Look at all the key legislations (including the campaign for political participation of women) in the last fifteen years. None of them came from the mainstream political parties Most of the demand first emerged in the political-civil space beyond the political parties and then political parties 'responded' by absorbing them in to the policy agenda. And this happens when the sole preoccupation of political parties end up as 'winning or losing ' an election.
Ideology took a back seat - except in the empty slogans and rhetoric. Interest of the leaders (in capturing power of the state) often took a front seat. Politics of electoral convenience often replaced the politics of conviction. Political opportunism itself was elevated in to 'smart' politics- hiring 'media' experts, advertising professionals, 'campaign' managers- and slogans often coined by the copy-writers of the ad-firms in charge of 'designing' the best 'campaigns' to earn more seats( by hook or crook). This is a far cry from the politics of the ideals and ideas of the Nehruvian phase in the post independent India.
When ideology (or political vision or mission) gets replaced by a mix of identity (cast, creed, language ) and 'interest' based electoral arithmetic, the real politics of transformation simply fail to go beyond the 'pressure' politics and redundant rhetoric played for the moment. It is in such spaces that civil society activism find its relevance and influence in the mainstream political landscape of India.
5) Whether one likes it or not, middle class always shaped the broader political discourse in India or elsewhere- from communism to capitalism to fascism to Hindutva. So the role of middle class in the Indian politics is nothing new. Most of the ideologues and political leaders came from the ‘great’ Indian middle class- and largely from the upper cast.
Anna Hazare happened to be simply a signifier: here the old symbols of 'ideals' met with new modes of mobilisation- beyond the usual institutional network of political parties. There is also a message: those in government or power can no longer simply take people for granted. And in the age of social networking- mobilisation and public opinions can also be shaped beyond the mainstream media and mainstream politics. There is the possibility of a new politics beyond ‘winning’ elections every five years and enjoying the stay in the corridors of the state power.
6) The rural-urban divide has political implications in India. In the post-independent India, there has been four major political transitions- (towards the end of 60s the end of Nehruvian era-; the end 70s- the end of congress period- and one party rule in post-emergency phase ; the end 80s- the emergence of the telegenic politics in the age of globalisation, and assertive Hindutva competing for vote bank. All these periods were marked by various degrees of political expressions and modes of mobilisation. Almost all of them had an urban middle class link- even in the case of Naxals- in shaping the discourse.
7) However, it would be rather simplistic to compare the new social- network based mobilisation of the urban middle class to the Gandhian mode of political struggles for freedom against colonialism and imperialism. Politics against injustice, oppression and domination preceded the methods of Gandhi. Gandhian methods did not define his politics. His politics and ethics shaped his choice of methods and communication. Gandhi’s politics was the politics of the masses- and not the politics of the mass media. Gandhi worked and lived with people, listened to them, educated and empowered them- and spent a life time experimenting with his ideas and methods, without compromising the ideals for transformation. Gandhi sought to transform politics and not to transcend politics.
Here, in the case of the media –driven performance of the Anna team, method preceded the politics. It was more of the politics of instant performance, seeking to influence perceptions of a particular class, rather than a mass politics to challenge and change the situation. It sought to ‘transcend’ politics rather than transforming politics. It sought to create symbols devoid of substance. It is interesting to note that how Anna team sought to play around with symbols of ‘convenience’ playing to the need of the media market. The performance of protest began in the backdrop the ‘bharat-matha’ ( mother India), appealing to the upper cast ‘Hindu’ sentiments- and then shifted to the use of an elegantly designed photograph of Gandhi with ‘Charkha’ and waving the tri-coloure national flag to ‘nationalise’ and ‘secularise’ the performance of a fast. A colourful performance of protest, where Kiran Bidi played the Cheer leader on the ‘stage’ and Anna pretended to be Gandhi was a spectacle of a performance as an instant politics meant for the media. Masses became simply a means to ‘show off’ the power- rather than the real source of power. Hence, it was a mockery of Gandhian principles, practise and methods of politics. In Gandhian case, media followed his politics. In this case, the politics of performance followed the media.
9) Anna was more of symbol in a campaign- primarily promoted by the Delhi-centric upper cast and middle class-actors. The anomaly of Anna ( an ex-army man from rural India of ‘jai-jawan- jai kisan variety, with a bit of Gandhian touch and grassroots NGO background) in the urban-back drop and mass media provided the combination of a seeming ‘ideal’ with combination of instant networking. Anna symbolised the ‘old’ India, and the young India was performed by the ‘youth’ on the street- all televised instantly as the performance of a spectacle, with the corallarly drama created in the TV studios. Kiran Bedi performed for the media- the spectacle of the elite post-retirement ‘civil servant’ transiting in to ‘civil society’'activist' in search of the TV cameras. ‘Civil society’ itself became a residual space for the new elites to find their space within the media mediations. The Bollywood and the ‘Lagan’ fame Amir Khan added a celebrity flavour to the new ‘civil society’ celebrities manufactured by the media.
It was indeed a smart experiment in the new mode of advocacy campaign - making strategic use of symbols ( Anna too was one), media and networking. And it was not a 'political struggle'- or a Satyagraha of Gandhian politics. It was an example of smart urban-based advocacy campaign. Though there are many interesting lessons to learn from it - it can't be compared with a political struggle of salt sataygraha or even the anti-emergency campaign.
How can a bill made by a team of four or five people, making a rather tall claim of a 'people's (or Jan) Lokpal bill? They hardly consulted or discussed with people on the ground in a diverse country of more than a billion people. They sought to connect with people through media, rather than the other way around. And of course, there were also characters in the Anna team (from soft saffron to those who were looking for 'celebrity' spot on the TV) who got them excited by their voice and sight in the TV- and them performed-waving the national flag- for the TV crew, ever hungry for the next spectacle. Their protest was indeed significant and it is indicative of the transition, even though it is of instant transitory type of politics of protest.
10) While I think the mobilisation is indicative of a trend, I do not agree with the content and modes of Anna team- particularly its tall claim of ‘second freedom struggle’ or mass-based politics. Bringing thousands of people on the few streets of few cities of India, through media and networking- is not a substitute for the substantive politics in a country of more than 1.2 billion of people.
In a parliamentary democracy, the role of parliament is cardinal. Political parties are the main political force in the country that sustains the health of a representative system of democracy. I also think there are a large number of committed and aware politicians with a sense of integrity. Just because a section of politicians and political party system is corrupt - does not mean that the political class - as a whole - is corrupt.
While it may be important to challenge and influence those who hold power- of the state, it is also important to recognise the limitations of 'quick-fix' seven day wonders of televised mobilisation. Because such advocacy campaign can simply create illusions of politics when actually such 'televised' quick-fix mobilisation can undermine the real political or democratic struggles on the ground. And the campaign for the so-called 'Jan' lokpal bill was an example of a relatively successful advocacy campaign for a policy change, and not an example of a political struggle for freedom or against injustice. )
The ongoing phase of politics is indicative of a political transition. The politics in India in the next ten years may be dramatically different - in terms of modes of mobilisation, composition of leadership and the issues that would come up. So the mode of mobilisation of those who are born in the eighties is indicative of a bigger shift. The anti-corruption campaign just happened to be a space to voice a discontent with the mainstream political party process in India- where the lineage matters more than the real politics. If the political parties do not change their hardware and present modes of operation, many of them would not be able to mobilise people beyond the elction season,in the years to come
Saturday, July 30, 2011
ഓസ്ലോവില് ഒരു ദു:ഖ ഞായര്
Posted on: 25 Jul 2011 ( mathrubhoomi)
ജോണ് സാമുവല്
ഓസ്ലോവില് എന്റെ ഏറ്റവും ദു:ഖാര്ത്തനമായ ഞായറാഴ്ചയാണ് പിന്നിട്ടത്. പൊതുവെ പ്രസന്നമായ നഗരത്തിന്റെ ഈ നാളുകളിലെ കണ്ണീരുപോലെ രാവിലെ മഴ ചാറിക്കൊണ്ടിരുന്നു. ഇന്നലെ ഞെട്ടലിനോടും അവിശ്വാസത്തോടും പൊരുത്തപ്പെടാന് ശ്രമിക്കുകയായിരുന്നു ജനങ്ങള്. ഏങ്ങും ദു:ഖം നഗരത്തെ പൊതിഞ്ഞുനില്ക്കു ന്നു. നൂറുകണക്കിനാളുകള് പൂക്കളുമായി പള്ളികളിലേക്ക് പോകുന്നത് എനിക്ക് ജനലിലൂടെ കാണാമായിരുന്നു. പൊതുവെ കൊച്ചുമക്കളുമായി വരുന്ന വൃദ്ധജനങ്ങളെയാണ് പള്ളികളില് കാണാറുള്ളത്. ഈ ഞായറാഴ്ച വ്യത്യസ്തമായിരുന്നു. ഞാനും അപാര്്ികമെന്റിനടുത്ത പള്ളിയില് പോയി. സംഗീതമോ പ്രസംഗമോ ഉണ്ടായിരുന്നില്ല. എങ്ങും മൂകത, മെഴുകുതിരികള്, പൂക്കള്, മെഴുകുതിരി കത്തിച്ച് എല്ലാവരും എഴുനേറ്റുനിന്നു. നിശ്ശബ്ദമായി പ്രാര്ത്ഥിചക്കാനേ മനസ്സുവരുന്നുള്ളൂ. അസാധാരണമായി ഇന്ന് ഒരുപാട് ചെറുപ്പക്കാര് പള്ളിയിലെത്തിയിരുന്നു.
നഗരത്തിലൂടെ നടക്കുമ്പോഴും ഈ ദു:ഖഭാവം എങ്ങും തളംകെട്ടിനില്ക്കു ന്നത് കാണാമായിരുന്നു. രണ്ടു സുഹൃത്തുക്കള് എങ്ങനെ കൂട്ടക്കൊലയില് നിന്ന് രക്ഷപ്പെട്ടു എന്ന് ഇന്നുരാവിലെ കേട്ടു. മൂത്രപ്പുരയില് പത്തുപേരാണ് ഒളിച്ചിരുന്നുരക്ഷപ്പെട്ടത്. ഒരാള് വെള്ളത്തിലേക്ക് എടുത്ത് ചാടി മറുകരയിലേക്ക് നീന്തിരക്ഷപ്പെട്ടു. ശ്രീലങ്കന് വംശജരായ മൂന്നുപേര് കുറ്റിക്കാടുകള്ക്കിതടയില് ഒളിഞ്ഞിരുന്നാണ് രക്ഷ നേടിയത്. പ്രധാനമന്ത്രിയുടെ ഓഫീസ് അടുത്താണ്. പുറത്ത് യുവാക്കളായ സുരക്ഷാഭടന്മാര് കാവല്നി ല്ക്കു ന്നു. അവരും നിശ്ശബ്ദരാണ്. ഇരുപത്-ഇരുപത്തിരണ്ട് വയസ്സുള്ളവര്. യൂണിഫോമിലല്ലെങ്കില് പട്ടാളക്കാരാണ് എന്ന് തോന്നുകയേ ഇല്ല. ഈ പ്രായക്കാരായ 91 പേരാണ് വെടിയേറ്റ് വീണുമരിച്ചത്.
നഗരമദ്ധ്യത്തിലെ കത്തീഡ്രലിന്റെ മുന്വേശം പൂക്കളും കത്തുന്ന മെഴുകതിരികളും കളിപ്പാട്ടങ്ങളും കൊണ്ട് നിറഞ്ഞിരിക്കുന്നു. വൈകീട്ട് നടന്ന പ്രത്യേക ദ:ഖാചരണച്ചടങ്ങില് ഞാനും പങ്കെടുത്തിരുന്നു. നൂറില്താഖഴെ ആളുകള് മാത്രം വരാറുള്ള ഹാളില് അറുനൂറോളം പേരുണ്ടായിരുന്നു. പള്ളി നിറഞ്ഞുകവിഞ്ഞു. ഭക്തിഗാനാലാപം തുടങ്ങിയപ്പോള് ആളുകളുടെ കവിളില് കണ്ണീരൊഴുകുന്നത് കാണാമായിരുന്നു. എല്ലാവര്ക്കും ഒരു ബന്ധുവിന്റെ സുഹൃത്തിന്റെ സഹപ്രവര്ത്ത കന്റെ വിയോഗത്തിന്റെ വേദനയുണ്ട്. ഒറ്റ സന്താനങ്ങളെ നഷ്ടപ്പെട്ട മാതാപിതാക്കള് എത്രയോ ഉണ്ട്. മരിച്ച ഒരു കൊച്ചുപയ്യന് പതിമൂന്നുവയസ്സേ പ്രായമുണ്ടായിരുന്നുള്ളൂ, ഏറ്റവും ഇളയ രക്തസാക്ഷി. ഒരുപത്തുവയസ്സുകാരന്റെ പിതാവായതുകൊണ്ട് എനിക്ക് ആ മാതാപിതാക്കളുടെ മനസ്സുകാണാന് കഴിഞ്ഞു. സര്വീ സിന് ശേഷം എല്ലാവരും നിശ്ശബ്ദരായി കുറെനേരം പുറത്തെ തുറസ്സില് നിന്നു. അവര് തീരാക്കണ്ണീരില് നുറുനുറുഅനുഭവങ്ങള് പങ്കുവെക്കുകയായിരുന്നു. നേരിയ മഴ, പ്രകൃതിയുടെ കണ്ണീര്. മെഴുകുതിരികള്ക്കി ടയില് ടെഡ്ഡി കരടികളും ബാര്ബി് ഡോളുകളും, ഓരോന്നിനും എന്തെല്ലാം ഓര്മ കള്. കരയാതിരിക്കാന് കഴിയുന്നില്ല.
മരിച്ചുവീണവരെല്ലാം ശോഭനമായ ഒരു ഭാവി മുന്നില് കണ്ട ഭാവിയുടെ നേതാക്കളായിരുന്നു. ഒരുപാട് കഴിവുകളും പ്രതീക്ഷകളും ഉള്ളവര്. വര്ഷം്തോറും ജുലായില് നടക്കുന്ന ഇതുപോലുള്ള ക്യാമ്പുകളില് പങ്കെടുത്ത് വളര്ന്നാ ണ് പ്രധാനമന്ത്ര സ്റ്റോല്ട്ന്ബ ര്ഗും് കേബിനറ്റ് മന്ത്രിമാരുമെല്ലാം ആ നിലയിലേക്ക് എത്തിയത്. മരിച്ചവരില് ചിലരെങ്കിലും ഇതുപോലെ വളരേണ്ടവരായിരുന്നു. നല്ല സമൂഹത്തിനും ഭാവിക്കും വേണ്ടി വലിയ സ്വപ്നങ്ങള് കണ്ടവരാണ് അവര്. വെറുപ്പിന്റെ പ്രത്യയശാസ്ത്രവുമായി വന്ന മറ്റൊരു യുവാവാണ് ഇത്രയും യുവത്വങ്ങളെ തല്ലിക്കെടുത്തിയത്.
നിറഞ്ഞ യൗവനത്തില് ജ്വലിച്ചുനിന്ന പ്രിയ സന്താനങ്ങള് നഷ്ടപ്പെട്ട അനേകര്ക്ക്സ വേണ്ടി പ്രാര്ത്ഥിിക്കാനേ നമുക്കും കഴിയൂ. ആഘോഷമായ യൗവനം, പൊടുന്നനെ തകര്ന്ന് സ്വപ്നങ്ങള്. ഇതൊരു ക്രൂരലോകമാണ്.
ഞാനും ഒരു മെഴുകുതിരി തെളിയിച്ചു.
(മനുഷ്യാവകാശ പ്രവര്ത്തികനും എഴുത്തുകാരനും ഗവേഷകനുമാണ് അടൂര് സ്വദേശിയായ ജോണ് സാമുവല് ഇപ്പോള് ഓസ്ലോവില് താമസിക്കുന്നു
ജോണ് സാമുവല്
ഓസ്ലോവില് എന്റെ ഏറ്റവും ദു:ഖാര്ത്തനമായ ഞായറാഴ്ചയാണ് പിന്നിട്ടത്. പൊതുവെ പ്രസന്നമായ നഗരത്തിന്റെ ഈ നാളുകളിലെ കണ്ണീരുപോലെ രാവിലെ മഴ ചാറിക്കൊണ്ടിരുന്നു. ഇന്നലെ ഞെട്ടലിനോടും അവിശ്വാസത്തോടും പൊരുത്തപ്പെടാന് ശ്രമിക്കുകയായിരുന്നു ജനങ്ങള്. ഏങ്ങും ദു:ഖം നഗരത്തെ പൊതിഞ്ഞുനില്ക്കു ന്നു. നൂറുകണക്കിനാളുകള് പൂക്കളുമായി പള്ളികളിലേക്ക് പോകുന്നത് എനിക്ക് ജനലിലൂടെ കാണാമായിരുന്നു. പൊതുവെ കൊച്ചുമക്കളുമായി വരുന്ന വൃദ്ധജനങ്ങളെയാണ് പള്ളികളില് കാണാറുള്ളത്. ഈ ഞായറാഴ്ച വ്യത്യസ്തമായിരുന്നു. ഞാനും അപാര്്ികമെന്റിനടുത്ത പള്ളിയില് പോയി. സംഗീതമോ പ്രസംഗമോ ഉണ്ടായിരുന്നില്ല. എങ്ങും മൂകത, മെഴുകുതിരികള്, പൂക്കള്, മെഴുകുതിരി കത്തിച്ച് എല്ലാവരും എഴുനേറ്റുനിന്നു. നിശ്ശബ്ദമായി പ്രാര്ത്ഥിചക്കാനേ മനസ്സുവരുന്നുള്ളൂ. അസാധാരണമായി ഇന്ന് ഒരുപാട് ചെറുപ്പക്കാര് പള്ളിയിലെത്തിയിരുന്നു.
നഗരത്തിലൂടെ നടക്കുമ്പോഴും ഈ ദു:ഖഭാവം എങ്ങും തളംകെട്ടിനില്ക്കു ന്നത് കാണാമായിരുന്നു. രണ്ടു സുഹൃത്തുക്കള് എങ്ങനെ കൂട്ടക്കൊലയില് നിന്ന് രക്ഷപ്പെട്ടു എന്ന് ഇന്നുരാവിലെ കേട്ടു. മൂത്രപ്പുരയില് പത്തുപേരാണ് ഒളിച്ചിരുന്നുരക്ഷപ്പെട്ടത്. ഒരാള് വെള്ളത്തിലേക്ക് എടുത്ത് ചാടി മറുകരയിലേക്ക് നീന്തിരക്ഷപ്പെട്ടു. ശ്രീലങ്കന് വംശജരായ മൂന്നുപേര് കുറ്റിക്കാടുകള്ക്കിതടയില് ഒളിഞ്ഞിരുന്നാണ് രക്ഷ നേടിയത്. പ്രധാനമന്ത്രിയുടെ ഓഫീസ് അടുത്താണ്. പുറത്ത് യുവാക്കളായ സുരക്ഷാഭടന്മാര് കാവല്നി ല്ക്കു ന്നു. അവരും നിശ്ശബ്ദരാണ്. ഇരുപത്-ഇരുപത്തിരണ്ട് വയസ്സുള്ളവര്. യൂണിഫോമിലല്ലെങ്കില് പട്ടാളക്കാരാണ് എന്ന് തോന്നുകയേ ഇല്ല. ഈ പ്രായക്കാരായ 91 പേരാണ് വെടിയേറ്റ് വീണുമരിച്ചത്.
നഗരമദ്ധ്യത്തിലെ കത്തീഡ്രലിന്റെ മുന്വേശം പൂക്കളും കത്തുന്ന മെഴുകതിരികളും കളിപ്പാട്ടങ്ങളും കൊണ്ട് നിറഞ്ഞിരിക്കുന്നു. വൈകീട്ട് നടന്ന പ്രത്യേക ദ:ഖാചരണച്ചടങ്ങില് ഞാനും പങ്കെടുത്തിരുന്നു. നൂറില്താഖഴെ ആളുകള് മാത്രം വരാറുള്ള ഹാളില് അറുനൂറോളം പേരുണ്ടായിരുന്നു. പള്ളി നിറഞ്ഞുകവിഞ്ഞു. ഭക്തിഗാനാലാപം തുടങ്ങിയപ്പോള് ആളുകളുടെ കവിളില് കണ്ണീരൊഴുകുന്നത് കാണാമായിരുന്നു. എല്ലാവര്ക്കും ഒരു ബന്ധുവിന്റെ സുഹൃത്തിന്റെ സഹപ്രവര്ത്ത കന്റെ വിയോഗത്തിന്റെ വേദനയുണ്ട്. ഒറ്റ സന്താനങ്ങളെ നഷ്ടപ്പെട്ട മാതാപിതാക്കള് എത്രയോ ഉണ്ട്. മരിച്ച ഒരു കൊച്ചുപയ്യന് പതിമൂന്നുവയസ്സേ പ്രായമുണ്ടായിരുന്നുള്ളൂ, ഏറ്റവും ഇളയ രക്തസാക്ഷി. ഒരുപത്തുവയസ്സുകാരന്റെ പിതാവായതുകൊണ്ട് എനിക്ക് ആ മാതാപിതാക്കളുടെ മനസ്സുകാണാന് കഴിഞ്ഞു. സര്വീ സിന് ശേഷം എല്ലാവരും നിശ്ശബ്ദരായി കുറെനേരം പുറത്തെ തുറസ്സില് നിന്നു. അവര് തീരാക്കണ്ണീരില് നുറുനുറുഅനുഭവങ്ങള് പങ്കുവെക്കുകയായിരുന്നു. നേരിയ മഴ, പ്രകൃതിയുടെ കണ്ണീര്. മെഴുകുതിരികള്ക്കി ടയില് ടെഡ്ഡി കരടികളും ബാര്ബി് ഡോളുകളും, ഓരോന്നിനും എന്തെല്ലാം ഓര്മ കള്. കരയാതിരിക്കാന് കഴിയുന്നില്ല.
മരിച്ചുവീണവരെല്ലാം ശോഭനമായ ഒരു ഭാവി മുന്നില് കണ്ട ഭാവിയുടെ നേതാക്കളായിരുന്നു. ഒരുപാട് കഴിവുകളും പ്രതീക്ഷകളും ഉള്ളവര്. വര്ഷം്തോറും ജുലായില് നടക്കുന്ന ഇതുപോലുള്ള ക്യാമ്പുകളില് പങ്കെടുത്ത് വളര്ന്നാ ണ് പ്രധാനമന്ത്ര സ്റ്റോല്ട്ന്ബ ര്ഗും് കേബിനറ്റ് മന്ത്രിമാരുമെല്ലാം ആ നിലയിലേക്ക് എത്തിയത്. മരിച്ചവരില് ചിലരെങ്കിലും ഇതുപോലെ വളരേണ്ടവരായിരുന്നു. നല്ല സമൂഹത്തിനും ഭാവിക്കും വേണ്ടി വലിയ സ്വപ്നങ്ങള് കണ്ടവരാണ് അവര്. വെറുപ്പിന്റെ പ്രത്യയശാസ്ത്രവുമായി വന്ന മറ്റൊരു യുവാവാണ് ഇത്രയും യുവത്വങ്ങളെ തല്ലിക്കെടുത്തിയത്.
നിറഞ്ഞ യൗവനത്തില് ജ്വലിച്ചുനിന്ന പ്രിയ സന്താനങ്ങള് നഷ്ടപ്പെട്ട അനേകര്ക്ക്സ വേണ്ടി പ്രാര്ത്ഥിിക്കാനേ നമുക്കും കഴിയൂ. ആഘോഷമായ യൗവനം, പൊടുന്നനെ തകര്ന്ന് സ്വപ്നങ്ങള്. ഇതൊരു ക്രൂരലോകമാണ്.
ഞാനും ഒരു മെഴുകുതിരി തെളിയിച്ചു.
(മനുഷ്യാവകാശ പ്രവര്ത്തികനും എഴുത്തുകാരനും ഗവേഷകനുമാണ് അടൂര് സ്വദേശിയായ ജോണ് സാമുവല് ഇപ്പോള് ഓസ്ലോവില് താമസിക്കുന്നു
Sunday, July 24, 2011
A Sorrowful Sunday
John Samuel
This was my saddest Sunday in Oslo. The drizzle in the morning conveyed the mood of the otherwise cheerful city in the summer. Yesterday most of the people were grappling with sense of shock and disbelief. And on the Sunday morning, a sense of sorrow engulfed the city. From the morning, I could see from my window, hundreds of people going to the church with flowers. On a usual Sunday service, there would be only few people, mostly grandparents who come with their grand children. This morning it was different, I could see hundreds of people in silence going to the church. I too decided to go to the church next to my apartment. There was no music. There was no sermon. There was only silence, candles and flowers. They lit the candle stood there in silence. Everyone was in a mood of silent prayer. It was rather unusual to find so many young people in the church.
As I walked around the city I could sense the deep sorrow of a Sunday. My friend this morning told how two of his neighbours managed to escape. There were ten of them hiding in the toilet and one of jumped in to the water and swam to safety to another side. There were three young people of Sri Lankan origin; they saved themselves by hiding in the bushes.
As I walked past the road to the Prime Minister’s office, I noted the young soldiers who stood in sorrowful silence. They were hardly twenty or twenty two. More than ninety people who died are of their age. They hardly look like military men, except for their uniform- as they too stood there with a silence of a deep sorrow.
The square in front of the cathedral at city centre was filled with thousands of candles, heaps of flower, and lots of toys. The Prime Minister and King attended the Sunday service at 11 am. I went to the cathedral for the special mourning service in the after-noon. I have never seen more than hundred people on the usual Sunday service in the city cathedral that could accommodate at least six hundred people. Today there was no space; the church was overflowing. As the coir began to sing the hymn, I could see the channels of tears on many faces. We all stood together in a prayerful moment, where everyone was mourning for their dear children or a friend or a relative or a fellow Norwegian. So many parents lost their only one son or daughter. The youngest one who was killed was just thirteen years. As I too have teen age son, I could sense the rather unspeakable and unbearable sorrow of few parents who were in the Cathedral. After the service, I too spent some time in silence in the square where a thousand of tales of sorrow was shared in pindrop silence. I could only hear soft drizzle- as if the nature too shed tears for those young kids. My Norwegian friend told me about two young girls who got killed and their cousins came with stuffed dolls that they shared in their childhood. Many teddy bears and Barbie-dolls in the midst of flowers and candles told the intimate sense of the loss. Those toys belonged to the kids who were shot down. I thought of my own son of the same age. It was difficult for me to hold back the tears.
Many of them were young leaders with immense qualities and promise. The annual summer camps where they showed their talents, promises could have helped them to move to mainstream politics or policy roles. The Prime Minister Stoltenberg and the cabinet ministers, the labour party leaders grew up participating in the annual summer camp in every July. And many of those who killed could have become leaders of Norway or at a world stage. It was not be so. Those young people were the one who dreamt for a just, equitable and sustainable society. They represented the best of the social democratic values of Norway. And they were just blooming. - Most of them in their teen age. Another young man, poisoned with another indoctrinated ideology of hate, decided to shoot them down.
They were at their prime of dreams and imagination. I could only say a silent prayer for those parents and family who lost their very dear children at their prime; those children who were celebrating their youth and dreams. And the dreams got shattered.
It is a cruel world.
I too lit a candle.
This was my saddest Sunday in Oslo. The drizzle in the morning conveyed the mood of the otherwise cheerful city in the summer. Yesterday most of the people were grappling with sense of shock and disbelief. And on the Sunday morning, a sense of sorrow engulfed the city. From the morning, I could see from my window, hundreds of people going to the church with flowers. On a usual Sunday service, there would be only few people, mostly grandparents who come with their grand children. This morning it was different, I could see hundreds of people in silence going to the church. I too decided to go to the church next to my apartment. There was no music. There was no sermon. There was only silence, candles and flowers. They lit the candle stood there in silence. Everyone was in a mood of silent prayer. It was rather unusual to find so many young people in the church.
As I walked around the city I could sense the deep sorrow of a Sunday. My friend this morning told how two of his neighbours managed to escape. There were ten of them hiding in the toilet and one of jumped in to the water and swam to safety to another side. There were three young people of Sri Lankan origin; they saved themselves by hiding in the bushes.
As I walked past the road to the Prime Minister’s office, I noted the young soldiers who stood in sorrowful silence. They were hardly twenty or twenty two. More than ninety people who died are of their age. They hardly look like military men, except for their uniform- as they too stood there with a silence of a deep sorrow.
The square in front of the cathedral at city centre was filled with thousands of candles, heaps of flower, and lots of toys. The Prime Minister and King attended the Sunday service at 11 am. I went to the cathedral for the special mourning service in the after-noon. I have never seen more than hundred people on the usual Sunday service in the city cathedral that could accommodate at least six hundred people. Today there was no space; the church was overflowing. As the coir began to sing the hymn, I could see the channels of tears on many faces. We all stood together in a prayerful moment, where everyone was mourning for their dear children or a friend or a relative or a fellow Norwegian. So many parents lost their only one son or daughter. The youngest one who was killed was just thirteen years. As I too have teen age son, I could sense the rather unspeakable and unbearable sorrow of few parents who were in the Cathedral. After the service, I too spent some time in silence in the square where a thousand of tales of sorrow was shared in pindrop silence. I could only hear soft drizzle- as if the nature too shed tears for those young kids. My Norwegian friend told me about two young girls who got killed and their cousins came with stuffed dolls that they shared in their childhood. Many teddy bears and Barbie-dolls in the midst of flowers and candles told the intimate sense of the loss. Those toys belonged to the kids who were shot down. I thought of my own son of the same age. It was difficult for me to hold back the tears.
Many of them were young leaders with immense qualities and promise. The annual summer camps where they showed their talents, promises could have helped them to move to mainstream politics or policy roles. The Prime Minister Stoltenberg and the cabinet ministers, the labour party leaders grew up participating in the annual summer camp in every July. And many of those who killed could have become leaders of Norway or at a world stage. It was not be so. Those young people were the one who dreamt for a just, equitable and sustainable society. They represented the best of the social democratic values of Norway. And they were just blooming. - Most of them in their teen age. Another young man, poisoned with another indoctrinated ideology of hate, decided to shoot them down.
They were at their prime of dreams and imagination. I could only say a silent prayer for those parents and family who lost their very dear children at their prime; those children who were celebrating their youth and dreams. And the dreams got shattered.
It is a cruel world.
I too lit a candle.
Saturday, July 23, 2011
Tragedy in theLand of Midnight Sun.
Norway’s paradox of prosperity
In peaceful, open and newly-prosperous Norway, where migrants now constitute 10% of the population, Anders Breivik is the face of increasing socio-political prejudice against the ‘other’ who looks different, eats different and prays different, writes John Samuel from Oslo
The tragedy that unfolded in the Land of the Midnight Sun has shocked those of us who live in Oslo, one of the most peaceful cities of the world. On July 22 Anders Behring Breivik, a 32-year-old Norwegian man, went on a shooting spree at a youth camp of 600 people, on the beautiful island of Utoeya, 19 miles from Oslo. And in the afternoon, a massive bomb blast shook Oslo claiming at least seven lives and injuring hundreds.
Norway’s Black Friday (July 22, 2011) points to the paradox of prosperity. Breivik signifies the growing virulence of poisonous rightwing extremism in Europe.
Oslo is a calm and peaceful city. One can walk anywhere late into the night as if it were daytime, as the sun sets only for a few hours in summer. A city of just 600,000 people, Oslo also boasts one of the best facilities in the world.
The city is usually quiet on a Friday afternoon in July as most people are away on vacation. So, when I heard a huge noise and saw columns of smoke rising from my office window I was taken aback. A few seconds later, we could see ambulances and police cars whiz by as the tragedy of what had happened slowly unfolded before our eyes. It defied belief: Oslo was supposed to be one of the safest cities in the world!
The attack on Norway’s political heart and the shoot-out at the Labour Party youth camp are a rude reminder of the presence of rightwing extremist politics in Norway and other Nordic countries. It is reminiscent of the attack by American rightwing militant Timothy McVeigh who detonated a truck bomb at a federal building in Oklahoma City in 1995, killing 168 people.
Norway gained independence in 1905 when the union with Sweden was dissolved. Norwegians value their distinctive identity, prosperity, peace and open society. Perhaps for this reason, Norwegians rejected membership of the European Economic Community in 1972, and of the European Union in 1994, despite being urged by their governments to vote ‘yes’.
Norway’s distinct brand identity is that of a country of peace and for peace. Norway has been one of the biggest supporters of the United Nations and humanitarian work across the world. It has mediated between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation, and from 2000 to 2009, tried to play a role in resolving the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. Every day, as I walk by the Nobel Peace Institute, I am struck by just how proud Norwegians are of their peace credentials. The country has always been sympathetic towards people and communities at the receiving end of conflict and violence. This explains the relatively large numbers of Tamils from Sri Lanka, and people from Somalia and Sudan, in the heart of Oslo.
In a country of just 49 lakh people, Norway’s per capita income is one of the highest in the world. It is one of the richest countries in the world, with the best record on the human development index. The country’s annual income from oil alone is around US$ 40 billion. And the government’s National Sovereign Fund is expected to be around US$ 570 billion, according to recent estimates. In spite of the economic crisis in the US and Europe, the Norwegian economy has been doing well. Unemployment is just under 3%.
Norway’s social policy is one of the most progressive in the world. Every citizen has the right to quality education and universal quality healthcare. And every working person, including women who work at home as homemakers, is eligible for pension from the age of 67. This is a happy country. One wonders: how can there be discontent in such a society?
From a rather low-profile Nordic country, Norway hit the jackpot with the discovery of oil in the late-1960s and ended up as one of the most prosperous countries in the world. Norway is the fifth largest exporter of oil and third largest exporter of natural gas. And here begins the paradox of prosperity.
With the rise of income levels and relatively small population there has been a marked increase in nationalism. (All small countries have a greater sense of nationalism.) Among a certain section, ultra-nationalism is expressed in different forms ranging from simple social prejudice to various shades of discontent against the ‘other’.
Though neo-Nazi rightwing extremism directed against migrants is more obvious in Sweden and Denmark, there have been indications in Norway too (paradoxically, the most rightwing party in Norway is called the ‘Progressive Party’). Under the surface of a social democratic liberal framework, discontent and unease over the growing influence and economic capacity of migrant communities is discernible.
According to estimates, 61,200 immigrants arrived in Norway in 2007, an increase of 35% over 2006. At the start of 2010, there were 552,313 people in Norway with an immigrant background. Over 10% of people belong to various migrant communities. With facilities available to every citizen, irrespective of race, gender or ethnicity, rightwing politicians view migrants as parasites.
While the first-generation migrants were at the lower end of the professional ladder and informal sectors like cleaning and minding small corner shops, second-generation migrants are educated, smart and compete for jobs with young people. For example, the largest migrant community in Norway is people of Pakistani origin. Most of them migrated here in the late-’60s when it was relatively easy to migrate to Norway. First-generation migrants from Pakistan were low-skilled and worked largely in the informal sector. After a couple of generations, Norwegians of Pakistani origin make up one of the most prosperous migrant communities in the country. Their children compete for professional jobs, indeed many of them are economically successful thanks to a coherent family foundation and network.
In a society that is used to being ‘taken care of’, there is growing irritation about successful second-generation migrants competing for the same economic resources. Also, most migrants in Nordic countries happen to be Muslims from Asia or North Africa, strengthening racial and religious prejudices.
Below the surface of Norway’s progressive left-leaning policies there is also a conservative trend. Norway is the most ‘Christian’ of the Nordic countries. The Lutheran church is primarily supported by the state; pastors draw their salaries from the state budget. Liquor is heavily taxed. There is therefore an underlying tension between the old Christian society and new immigrants with a different sociology, theology, colour and culture. In a country with a relatively small population, these issues become accentuated, particularly when the migrant population constitutes more than 10% of the total population.
It’s only in the last 35 years that Norwegian society jumped from an agricultural-fishing economy to a booming oil economy. The reasons for a national commitment to humanitarian support and peace are largely the result of the relative deprivation that Norwegians had to undergo during World War II and afterwards. There is indeed a significant difference between the generation that grew up in the ’50s, ’60s and ’70s and the post-’80s generation that grew up in a wealthy Norway. The older generation placed great value on solidarity, left-leaning social democratic policy etc, because people wanted to share wealth. National heroes such as Fridtjof Nansen, a great pioneer of international humanitarian support, helped create a social consensus in favour of supporting the needy, poor and marginalised across the world. This social sensibility, influenced by a recent social history, core Christian ethics, a strong labour movement and social democratic politics has shaped the country’s social policies in favour of refugees and migrants.
It has also resulted in a society that places greater emphasis on social values than on opulence and extravagance. This is evident in Norwegian architecture: minimalist, functional, simple, and indicative of a society that considers understatement a core social value.
The economic boom of the last 30 years altered the perspective of the post-’80s generation. Many were born rich. They had access to quality education and healthcare; for higher education everyone is eligible for a loan from the government. Once a young person completes his/her education he/she is expected to get a job. Maternity leave is for a year, with full benefits. Paternity leave is for two months, with full benefits. Every working person who has paid tax is eligible for pension. People are generally happy paying tax as there are tangible benefits for everyone. The increasing visibility of migrant communities in cities like Oslo has created uneasiness about the ‘other’ enjoying the privileges of ‘Norwegian’ wealth and social policy.
The high cost of living and challenge of getting a high-paying job create new frustrations among many young people. So when migrants get top jobs or have a better earning capacity in a relatively homogeneous and less cosmopolitan society, social prejudices began to gain currency. Newspapers in Norway often ‘showcase’ the economic success stories of migrants. There are indeed many rags-to-riches stories among migrants who came to Oslo as pennyless refugees.
Such cumulative images -- along with the new wave of neo-Nazism in Europe -- can be a poisonous mix. Anders Breivik, it would appear, is a victim and a villain of increasing socio-political prejudices against the ‘other’ -- who looks different, eats different and prays different.
Norway has been ruled by a centre-left ‘red-green’ alliance with the socialist and centre parties since October 2005, when a centre-right government was replaced. Labour Party leader Jens Stoltenberg’s coalition narrowly retained its majority in the 2009 election, becoming the first Norwegian government to win a second consecutive term in 16 years. This could also have enraged rightwing extremists.
The government acted with an admirable sense of responsibility and confidence, without over-reacting, after the tragic events. The statement by Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg on the night of the tragedy captured the general mood of the Norwegian people in the hour of national crisis:
“Nobody is going to bomb us into silence; nobody is going to shoot us into silence. Tomorrow we will show the world that the Norwegian democracy grows in strength when it matters. We must never stop standing up for our values. We must show that Norwegian society can stand up to these testing times. We must show humanity, but not naivety.”
(These are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views or positions of any of the organisations with which he is associated)
Infochange News & Features, July 2011
In peaceful, open and newly-prosperous Norway, where migrants now constitute 10% of the population, Anders Breivik is the face of increasing socio-political prejudice against the ‘other’ who looks different, eats different and prays different, writes John Samuel from Oslo
The tragedy that unfolded in the Land of the Midnight Sun has shocked those of us who live in Oslo, one of the most peaceful cities of the world. On July 22 Anders Behring Breivik, a 32-year-old Norwegian man, went on a shooting spree at a youth camp of 600 people, on the beautiful island of Utoeya, 19 miles from Oslo. And in the afternoon, a massive bomb blast shook Oslo claiming at least seven lives and injuring hundreds.
Norway’s Black Friday (July 22, 2011) points to the paradox of prosperity. Breivik signifies the growing virulence of poisonous rightwing extremism in Europe.
Oslo is a calm and peaceful city. One can walk anywhere late into the night as if it were daytime, as the sun sets only for a few hours in summer. A city of just 600,000 people, Oslo also boasts one of the best facilities in the world.
The city is usually quiet on a Friday afternoon in July as most people are away on vacation. So, when I heard a huge noise and saw columns of smoke rising from my office window I was taken aback. A few seconds later, we could see ambulances and police cars whiz by as the tragedy of what had happened slowly unfolded before our eyes. It defied belief: Oslo was supposed to be one of the safest cities in the world!
The attack on Norway’s political heart and the shoot-out at the Labour Party youth camp are a rude reminder of the presence of rightwing extremist politics in Norway and other Nordic countries. It is reminiscent of the attack by American rightwing militant Timothy McVeigh who detonated a truck bomb at a federal building in Oklahoma City in 1995, killing 168 people.
Norway gained independence in 1905 when the union with Sweden was dissolved. Norwegians value their distinctive identity, prosperity, peace and open society. Perhaps for this reason, Norwegians rejected membership of the European Economic Community in 1972, and of the European Union in 1994, despite being urged by their governments to vote ‘yes’.
Norway’s distinct brand identity is that of a country of peace and for peace. Norway has been one of the biggest supporters of the United Nations and humanitarian work across the world. It has mediated between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation, and from 2000 to 2009, tried to play a role in resolving the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. Every day, as I walk by the Nobel Peace Institute, I am struck by just how proud Norwegians are of their peace credentials. The country has always been sympathetic towards people and communities at the receiving end of conflict and violence. This explains the relatively large numbers of Tamils from Sri Lanka, and people from Somalia and Sudan, in the heart of Oslo.
In a country of just 49 lakh people, Norway’s per capita income is one of the highest in the world. It is one of the richest countries in the world, with the best record on the human development index. The country’s annual income from oil alone is around US$ 40 billion. And the government’s National Sovereign Fund is expected to be around US$ 570 billion, according to recent estimates. In spite of the economic crisis in the US and Europe, the Norwegian economy has been doing well. Unemployment is just under 3%.
Norway’s social policy is one of the most progressive in the world. Every citizen has the right to quality education and universal quality healthcare. And every working person, including women who work at home as homemakers, is eligible for pension from the age of 67. This is a happy country. One wonders: how can there be discontent in such a society?
From a rather low-profile Nordic country, Norway hit the jackpot with the discovery of oil in the late-1960s and ended up as one of the most prosperous countries in the world. Norway is the fifth largest exporter of oil and third largest exporter of natural gas. And here begins the paradox of prosperity.
With the rise of income levels and relatively small population there has been a marked increase in nationalism. (All small countries have a greater sense of nationalism.) Among a certain section, ultra-nationalism is expressed in different forms ranging from simple social prejudice to various shades of discontent against the ‘other’.
Though neo-Nazi rightwing extremism directed against migrants is more obvious in Sweden and Denmark, there have been indications in Norway too (paradoxically, the most rightwing party in Norway is called the ‘Progressive Party’). Under the surface of a social democratic liberal framework, discontent and unease over the growing influence and economic capacity of migrant communities is discernible.
According to estimates, 61,200 immigrants arrived in Norway in 2007, an increase of 35% over 2006. At the start of 2010, there were 552,313 people in Norway with an immigrant background. Over 10% of people belong to various migrant communities. With facilities available to every citizen, irrespective of race, gender or ethnicity, rightwing politicians view migrants as parasites.
While the first-generation migrants were at the lower end of the professional ladder and informal sectors like cleaning and minding small corner shops, second-generation migrants are educated, smart and compete for jobs with young people. For example, the largest migrant community in Norway is people of Pakistani origin. Most of them migrated here in the late-’60s when it was relatively easy to migrate to Norway. First-generation migrants from Pakistan were low-skilled and worked largely in the informal sector. After a couple of generations, Norwegians of Pakistani origin make up one of the most prosperous migrant communities in the country. Their children compete for professional jobs, indeed many of them are economically successful thanks to a coherent family foundation and network.
In a society that is used to being ‘taken care of’, there is growing irritation about successful second-generation migrants competing for the same economic resources. Also, most migrants in Nordic countries happen to be Muslims from Asia or North Africa, strengthening racial and religious prejudices.
Below the surface of Norway’s progressive left-leaning policies there is also a conservative trend. Norway is the most ‘Christian’ of the Nordic countries. The Lutheran church is primarily supported by the state; pastors draw their salaries from the state budget. Liquor is heavily taxed. There is therefore an underlying tension between the old Christian society and new immigrants with a different sociology, theology, colour and culture. In a country with a relatively small population, these issues become accentuated, particularly when the migrant population constitutes more than 10% of the total population.
It’s only in the last 35 years that Norwegian society jumped from an agricultural-fishing economy to a booming oil economy. The reasons for a national commitment to humanitarian support and peace are largely the result of the relative deprivation that Norwegians had to undergo during World War II and afterwards. There is indeed a significant difference between the generation that grew up in the ’50s, ’60s and ’70s and the post-’80s generation that grew up in a wealthy Norway. The older generation placed great value on solidarity, left-leaning social democratic policy etc, because people wanted to share wealth. National heroes such as Fridtjof Nansen, a great pioneer of international humanitarian support, helped create a social consensus in favour of supporting the needy, poor and marginalised across the world. This social sensibility, influenced by a recent social history, core Christian ethics, a strong labour movement and social democratic politics has shaped the country’s social policies in favour of refugees and migrants.
It has also resulted in a society that places greater emphasis on social values than on opulence and extravagance. This is evident in Norwegian architecture: minimalist, functional, simple, and indicative of a society that considers understatement a core social value.
The economic boom of the last 30 years altered the perspective of the post-’80s generation. Many were born rich. They had access to quality education and healthcare; for higher education everyone is eligible for a loan from the government. Once a young person completes his/her education he/she is expected to get a job. Maternity leave is for a year, with full benefits. Paternity leave is for two months, with full benefits. Every working person who has paid tax is eligible for pension. People are generally happy paying tax as there are tangible benefits for everyone. The increasing visibility of migrant communities in cities like Oslo has created uneasiness about the ‘other’ enjoying the privileges of ‘Norwegian’ wealth and social policy.
The high cost of living and challenge of getting a high-paying job create new frustrations among many young people. So when migrants get top jobs or have a better earning capacity in a relatively homogeneous and less cosmopolitan society, social prejudices began to gain currency. Newspapers in Norway often ‘showcase’ the economic success stories of migrants. There are indeed many rags-to-riches stories among migrants who came to Oslo as pennyless refugees.
Such cumulative images -- along with the new wave of neo-Nazism in Europe -- can be a poisonous mix. Anders Breivik, it would appear, is a victim and a villain of increasing socio-political prejudices against the ‘other’ -- who looks different, eats different and prays different.
Norway has been ruled by a centre-left ‘red-green’ alliance with the socialist and centre parties since October 2005, when a centre-right government was replaced. Labour Party leader Jens Stoltenberg’s coalition narrowly retained its majority in the 2009 election, becoming the first Norwegian government to win a second consecutive term in 16 years. This could also have enraged rightwing extremists.
The government acted with an admirable sense of responsibility and confidence, without over-reacting, after the tragic events. The statement by Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg on the night of the tragedy captured the general mood of the Norwegian people in the hour of national crisis:
“Nobody is going to bomb us into silence; nobody is going to shoot us into silence. Tomorrow we will show the world that the Norwegian democracy grows in strength when it matters. We must never stop standing up for our values. We must show that Norwegian society can stand up to these testing times. We must show humanity, but not naivety.”
(These are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views or positions of any of the organisations with which he is associated)
Infochange News & Features, July 2011
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